83-1287

No. _____

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 26 1984
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, Warden,
Florida State Penitentiary,
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary,
Department of Corrections, and
JIM SMITH, Attorney General,
State of Florida,

Petitioners,

vs.

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Ceriotrari
To the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS ON JURISDICTION

JIM SMITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

MICHAEL J. KOTLER
Assistant Attorney General
Park Trammell Building
1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 272-2670

QUESTION PRESENTED

WHETHER THE CONTINUED REJECTION OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD OF SIXTH AMENDMENT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRES THIS COURT'S INTEVENTION AND ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AS IN THE PENDING CASE OF STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, CASE NO. 82-1554?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TABLE OF CITATIONS	i-vii
OPINIONS BELOW	1
JURISDICTION	1-2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS	3-4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	4-18
BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION	18
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT	18-35
CONCLUSION	36
APPENDIX:	
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals dated September 2, 1983; Judgment and Denial of Rehearing	A1-70
Opinion and Order of the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No.81-1092-Civ-T-WC, dated February 1, 1982	A71-100

TABLE OF CITATIONS

	PAGE
Baker v. State, 403 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind. 1980)	22
Barclay v. Florida, __U.S.__, 103 S.Ct 3418 (1983)	34
Barefoot v. Estelle, __U.S.__, 103 S.Ct. 3383 (1983)	34
Baynes v. United States, 687 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982)	21
Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. 1977)	23
Berry v. State, 345 So.2d 613 (Miss. 1977)	22
Blackmon v. State, 274 Ark. 202, 623 S.W.2d 184 (1981)	22
Buzzardo v. Benston, 643 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1981)	20
Cason v. State, 610 S.W.2d 891 (Ark. 1981)	22
Commonwealth v. Borelli, 431 A. 2d 1067 (Pa. 1981)	22
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 364 N.E.2d 1269 (1977)	23
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), en banc, cert. den. 440 U.S. 974 (1979)	20

	PAGE
In re Cronin, 133 Vt.234, 136 A.2d 154 (1975)	23
David v. Alabama, 196 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1979)	20
Hall v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1977)	22
Harris v. State, 293 A.2d 291 (Del. Sup. 1972)	23
Heinlin v. Smith, 542 F.2d 181 (Utah 1975)	22
Hoffer v. Peyton, 207 Va. 302, 149 S.E. 2d 893 (1966)	22
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	35
Johnson v. State, 620 F.2d 11 (1976)	23
King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. den. 450 U.S. 989 (1981)	1
King v. State, 407 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1981)	1
King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1983	1
King v. Strickland, Case No. 81-1092-Civ-T-WC (opinion issued February 10, 1982)	1
Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981	19

	PAGE
Lavalee v. Dellee Rose, 410 U. S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973)	34
Lewis v. State, 369 So.2d 542 (Ala. App. 1978), cert. den. 367 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1978)	23
LiPuma v. Commissinerr, Dept. of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84, at 92 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 861 (1977)	20
Lizotte v. State, 247 A.2d 613 (Me. 1968)	22
Maggio v. Fulford, __U.S.__, 103 S.Ct. ___,76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)	34
Marida v. State, 383 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. 1979)	22
Marshall v. Lumberger, __U.S.__, 103 S.Ct. ___, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983)	34
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), en banc, cert. den. 435 U.S. 1011 (1978)	21
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974)	20
Orona v. State, 638 F.2d 1077 (N.M. 1982)	23
People v. DeGraffenried, 19 Mich. App. 702, 173 S.W.2d 317 (1969)	23
People v. Garrow, 57 App. Div.2d 814, 379 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1976)	23

	PAGE
People v. Greer, 79 Ill.2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980)	23
People v. Kees, 32 Ill. 2d 199, at 305, 205 N.E,2d 729 (1965)	23
People v. McClure, 190 Colo. 250, 545 F.2d 1038 (1978)	22
People v. Pope, 152 Cal.Rptr.732 590 F.2d 859 (1979)	23
Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, at 1262, n. 54 (11th Cir.1982) cert. pending, U.S.Sup.Ct. Case 83-113	33
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed. 2d 66 (1982)	34
Risher v. State, 523 F.2d 421 (Alaska 1974)	23
Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 542 P.2d 881 (1973)	23
Schoonover v. State, 2 Kan. App. 2d 481, 582 P.2d 292 (1978)	23
Seales v. State, 580 S.W. 2d 733 (Mo. 1979)	22,23
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 at 613-614, (5th Cir. (1978), cert. den. 441 U.S. 978 (1979)	34
State v. Billiot, 370 So.2d 539 (La. 1979)	22

	PAGE
State v. Brech, 84 S.D. 177, 169 N.W. 2d 242 (1969)	22
State v. Clark, 170 Conn. 273, 365 A.2d 1167 (1976)	23
State v. Edge, 57 N. J. 580 274 A.2d 42 (1971)	22
State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976)	23
State v. Hyman, 281 S.C. 2d 209 (S.C. 1981)	22
State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 671 600 F.2d 1249 (1979)	22
State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 356 (Idaho 1975)	22
State v. Miller, 453, 568 F.2d 130 (1977)	22
State v. Sanchez, 652 P.2d 1232 (N.M. 1982)	23
State v. Tucker, 539 F.2d 356 (Idaho 1975)	22
State v. Watson, 653 F.2d 352 (Ariz. 1982)	23
Strickland v. Washington, Case No. 82-1554	32
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)	35
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 539 (1963)	35

PAGE

United States v. Altamirano, 633 F.2d 147, at 152 (9th Cir. 1980) 20

United States v. Cooper, 580 F. 2d 259, at 263 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1978) 20

United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 19

United States v. Gelardy, 567 f. 2d 863, at 865, n. 1 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 842 (1978) 21

United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980) 21

United States ex rel Healy v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, at 1057, n. 7 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. den. 414 U.S. 874 (1977) 20

United States v. Ingram, 477 F. 2d 236, at 240 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 840 (1973) 20

United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1980) 21

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1193 (1982) 31

United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, at 393 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 842 (1978) 20

	PAGE
Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1972)	21
Washington v. Estelle, 648 F. 2s 276, at 279, (5th Cir. 1981)	20
Washington v. Strickland, 693 F. 2d 1243 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B)	27,30
White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 248 N.W.2d 281 (1976)	23
White v. State, 591 F.2d 266 (Nev. 1979)	22
Woody v. United. States, 369 A.2d 592 (D.C. App. 1977)	23
Zant v. Stephens, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983)	34
Zimmer v. Langlois, 95 R.I. 446 188 A.2d 89 (1963)	22

Other Authorities:

28 U.S.C. §2254(a)	4
Constitutional Amendments:	
Amendment VI	3
Amendment XIV	3-4

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals is reported at King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1983). (App.1-70) That decision reviewed the judgment of the District Court reported at King v. Strickland, Case No. 81-1092 -T-WC. M.D.Fla., opinion issued February 10, 1982. (App.71-100) Opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida are reported at King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. den. 450 U.S. 989 (1981) and King v. State, 407 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1981).

II

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals by unanimous decision on September 2, 1983, affirmed in part and reversed in part the United States District Court's denial of defendant's petition for writ of habeas

corpus. As to that part of its decision reversing on the Sixth Amendment issue, the State of Florida filed its petition for rehearing and suggestion of en banc consideration. The state also filed a motion to stay mandate so that it could seek certiorati review in this Court.

On November 4, 1983, both the petition for rehearing and en banc consideration were denied, On December 14,1983 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the mandate in order that Petitioner could seek certiorari review by this Court.

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked pursuant to U. S. C. §1254(1).

III

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that:

> "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, where district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides *inter alia*, that:

> "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States

> and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

Title 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) provides that:

> "The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge or a District Court shall entertain an application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On or about March 21, 1977, the Office of the State Attorney of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida, filed a direct information against Amos Lee King in Circuit

Court Case No. 77-1696 charging him with escape and the attempted murder of James D. McDonough. On or about April 7, 1977, King was indicted by a Pinellas County, Florida Grand Jury in Circuit Court Case No. 77-2173 and charged with murder in the first degree of Natalie A. Brady, involuntary sexual battery, arson in the first degree and burglary.

The facts as presented at trial are as follows. On March 18, 1976, King was an inmate at the Tarpon Springs Community Correctional Center, a work release facility, serving a sentence for larceny of a firearm. (R.1291-1293) At 3:40 A.M. on this date, James McDonough, a prison counselor, made a routine bed check and discovered that King was absent from his room. (R.1369-1370) McDonough began a search of the facility and found King outside the building. (R.1373) King was

wearing light colored pants which had the crotch portion covered with blood. (R1379-1380) McDonough directed King back to the office control room inside the building. (R.1381) When the counselor turned to get handcuffs, King attacked him with a knife. (R.1392) A struggle ensued, and the counselor received several cuts and stab wounds. Two other inmates came to the control room, talked to King, and he left. (R.1400) King returned and found McDonough talking to his superiors on the telephone. King proceeded to stab the counselor again and cut the telephone cord. After King left, McDonough locked himself in a storage area until the police arrived. (R.1401-1406)

Later that morning (4:05 A.M.), the police and fire personnel arrived at the scene of a house fire approximately 1500 feet from the Correctional Center. (R. 1478-1480) The police discovered the body

of Natalie Brady during a search of the residence. (R,1570-1571) She had received two stab wounds, bruises over the chin and burns on her legs. (R.1784) An autopsy revealed other injuries which included bruises on the back of the head, hemorrhaging of the brain, hemorrhaging of the neck, and broken cartillage in the neck. (R.1793) There was a ragged tear of the vagina, apparently caused by the bloodstained wooden knitting needles which were found at the scene, as well as forcible intercourse. (R.1794-1797) King's blood type was found in Brady's vaginal washings. (R.1668, 1671, 1747-1748) The medical examiner attributed Mrs. Brady's death to multiple causes and established the time of death as 3:00 A.M. (R.1783-1784, 1801) Arson investigators concluded that the fire was intentionally set at approximately 3:00 to 3:30 A.M. (R.1563-1564, 1576)

On July 6, 1977, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as charged as to all counts of the indictment (inter alia charging King with murder in the first degree) and the direct information. On July 8, 1977, the trial judge sentenced King to death for the murder of Natalie A. Brady (Count I of the Indictment, Case No. 77-2173) and a term of years regarding the other counts of the indictment and the direct information.

On August 4, 1977, King filed a notice of appeal of his judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree and sentence of death to the Supreme Court of Florida. On May 8, 1980, King's judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree and sentence of death was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida in King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980).

On March 9, 1981, this Court denied King's petition for writ of certiorari.

See King v. State, 450 U.S. 989 (1981).

On October 7, 1981, King's request for clemency was presented to the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida. The request for clemency was rejected.

On or about October 9, 1981, King filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida.

On November 4, 1981, Honorable Bob Graham, Governor of the State of Florida signed a death warrant authorizing the Superintendent of Florida State Prison to execute King between noon on December 4, 1981 and noon on December 11, 1981.

On November 19, 1981, King's Motion for Post Conviction Relief filed pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 came on for an evidentiary hearing before Honorable John S. Andrews, Circuit Judge, in Clearwater,

Florida. After taking testimony and considering other matters, the trial court denied the motion.

On November 13, 1981, King timely filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court of Florida.

On Novewmber 27, 1981, King filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, and an application for a stay of executionm in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.

On December 3, 1981, a hearing on the application for stay of execution was held before Honorable William Castagna, United States District Court Judge, in Tampa, Florida.

On December 4, 1981, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the state trial court's denial of King's motion for post

conviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.850. See King v. State, 407 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1981).

The United States District Court below granted King's application for a stay of execution pending review of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Among the claims, he presented the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. On February 1, 1982, the court below, after receipt of a Response to King's petition for writ of habeas corpus issued an opinion denying the petition.

On February 10, 1982, the District Court formally denied King's petition for writ of habes corpus and vacated the stay of execution.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge in rejecting all other claims, but reversed on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim, determining that King was deprived

of his right to effective assistance of counsel since counsel presented limited evidence in mitigation and further, that certain remarks of counsel made in closing argument necessarily prejudiced the jury against King and caused them to issue a recommendation of death. King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481, at 1491 (11th Cir. 1983).1/

The facts material to consideration of the question presented are that after the jury returned its verdicts of guilty, the trial judge inquired as to whether counsel wanted to immediately proceed to the sentencing phase or take a short break. Mr. Cole informed the Court that he would appreciate a night to relax. Cole asked that the judge bring the jury

1/Defense Counsel (Thomas Cole) was dead at the time King brought his collateral attack.

back in the morning or on Monday. (R.2015) The judge then decided to have the jury polled to determine whether they would prefer to proceed with the penalty phase or come back the next day. (R.2016) The majority decided to proceed with the penalty phase. (R.2016) Mr. Cole then requested thirty minutes to get some witnesses together and the trial judge granted a brief recess. (R.2016-2018) When the court reconvened, the State presented its only evidence at the the sentencing phase of the trial, which was a certified copy of a Pasco County judgment of conviction for robbery in 1972. (R.2019)

During the guilt phase of the trial, Phillip Carol, the assistant manager of Nellie Kelly's Restaurant testified that King had been a good worker, in fact, one of the best he had. (R.1318, 1321-1322) Trial counsel also brought this testimony

to the attention of the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial. (R.2030)

At sentencing, trial counsel offered character testimony of a minister (Robert Henry) who had know King most of his life. (R.2028- 2030) Henry testified that he had always known King to be a good worker and a non-violent person. (R.2029)

Trial counsel also informed the jury that he had spoken to David Kurland, an attorney who represented King on the charge for which he was at the Tarpon Springs Correctional Center. (R.2030-2031) Mr. Kurland had indicated that while King was a man of limited education and very slow, he did not consider him to be a violent person and he was shocked when he heard King had been arrested on these charges. (R.k2031) Cole offered this testimony in mitigation at sentencing. (R.2031)

In his closing argument, Cole acknowledged that the killing of Natalie Brady was a "cruel and evil crime" (R. 2031-2031), however, it is readily apparent that he did this in an effort to gain credibility with the jury. At this point, his efforts were no longer directed at establishing his client's innocence, but rather to saving King's life. Cole emphasized that King would be confined for the remainder of his life with virtually no possibility of parole. (R.2032-2034)

Mr. Rondolino, who aided Mr. Cole in the preparation of this case for trial, only assisted in a limited manner. (TR. 122--123, 174) Rondolino only had a 50% independent recollection of this case. The remainder of his testimony was based on his review of the incomplete file of the Public Defender's Office. (TR.148-151) The penalty phase of the trial was

prepared and presented by Mr. Cole. (TR.134) Cole called one witness (a minister) to testify on King's behalf. (TR. 134) Rondolino acknowledged that it was desirable to have a minister testify as a character witness because his testimony is not as easily impeached as that of a family member. (TR.157-158) This witness had known King for a number of years. (TR.134) Rondolino suggested that Cole should have called other character witnesses to testify, but he was not able to say that additional witnesses were in fact available. While Cole's notes reflected a list of six character witnesses, Rondolino did not know how Cole gathered these names or why they were not called to testify. (TR.136-137-157) Judge Roney states at Page 1494 of the opinion that there was no indication that counsel contacted all of these witnesses to determine whether their testimony would

have been helpful. However, there is no indication that he did not contact them.

Willie Brown, Jr. was called by King to testify at the 3.850 hearing. (TR.233) Brown had known King for quite some time and had always found him to be non-violent. (Tr.235) While Brown characterized King as a nice young man, he had also heard that King had been involved in some break-ins and burglaries. (TR.235-237) Brown was subpoenaed to court, but he was not called to testify. (TR.236) The lawyer told him he did not need him. (TR.238) Brown stated that there were other people that would have come forward and testified on behalf of King, but he never said who these witneses were. (TR.237)

William Scott was also called to testify at the 3.850 hearing. Scott testified that King had worked for him in the past, and he had always found him to

be honest, trustworthy, respectful and non-violent. (Tr.239-240) Scott was summoned to court, however, he was never called to testify. (TR.240-241)

Amos Lee King, Jr. was called by counsel to testify at the hearing. (TR.242) He said that he had given a list of character witnesses to an investigator for the Public Defender's office. (TR. 245) King, however, never mentioned who these witnesses were. (Tr. 242-248)

V

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The basis of federal jurisdiction in the court of first instance was a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Title 28, §2254 U.S.C.

VI

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In rejecting the Florida test for measuring the constitutional standard for

assistance of counsel, the Eleventh Circuit has created not only a conflict but also an insoluble situation which can and must be resolved by this Court alone.

Any time the Florida Supreme Court (or any other state tribunal for that matter) applies the test derived from United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979), en banc, and enunciated as controlling in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), and concludes that no deprivation of a Sixth Amendment right occurred, that determination will effectively be reversed by the Eleventh Circuit.

Consequently, there exists such federal-state friction that unless this Court harmonizes the decisions on the issue, Florida will be improperly forced to subordinate its view of the law to one of the Eleventh Circuit which is clearly in conflict with other circuits.

Widespread conflict among the circuits and state jurisdictions exists as an addiional compelling reason for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. Decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth circuits, consistent with DeCoster and Knight appear to require that a defendant demonstrate that his claims have a likelihood of affecting the outcome of the cause. 2/ However, other decisions of those same courts have also applied a minimal showing of prejudice requirement. 3/ The Third,

---

2/ See, e.g., LiPuma v. Commissioner, Department of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84, at 92 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 861 (1977); United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, at 393 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 842 (1978); Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, at 279 (5th Cir. 1981); Buzzardo v. Benston, 643 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d 259, at 263 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236, at 240 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 840 (1973); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d

Fourth, Sixth and Tenth circuits have either presumed prejudice after an initial showing of ineffective counsel or not required any showing of prejudice by a defendant. 4/ In direct contrast, at least twenty (20) states either expressly adhere to the standard in DeCoster and Knight or have centered their analysis of inefective counsel claim upon a due process and fair trial analysis as to whether

207 (8th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), en banc, cert. den. 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Altamirano, 633 F.2d 147, at 152 (9th Cir. 1980).

3/ See, e.g., David v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980) (assuming prejudical error from failure to investigate); United States ex rel Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, at 1057, n. 7 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. den. 414 U.S. 874 (1977) (the harmless error rule is inapplicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1972).

4/ See, e.g., Baynes v. United States, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982) (any showing of

a defendant has demonstrated any likely effect upon the outcome of the cause. 5/ At least another twelve (12) states, while modifying the "farce and mockery" standard for review of claims of ineffective counsel, still maintain an outcome

---

harm requires a new trial); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), en banc, cert. den. 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (assuming prejudice if attorney is not "within the range of competence")'; United States v. Gelardy, 567 F.2d 863, at 865 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 842 (1978) (same); United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980) (proof of specific prejudice is not required); United States v.Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1980) (no prejudice requirement).

5/ See, State v. Hyman, 281 S.C. 2d 209 (S.C. 1981); Commonwealth v. Borelli, 431 A. 2d 1067 (Pa. 1981); Cason v. State, 610 S.W. 2d 891 (Ark. 1981); Baker v. State, 403 N.E. 2d 1069 (Ind. 1980); State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 674 (Idaho 1981); State v. Tucker, 539 F.2d 556 (Idaho 1975); see also, Blackmon v. State, 274 Ark. 202, 623 S.W.2d 184 (1981); People v. McClure, 190 Colo. 250, 545 F.2d 1038 (1976); Marida v. State, 383 N.E. 2d 1043 (Ind. 1979); Hall v. Commonwealth, 557 S.W. 2d 420 (Ky. 1977); State v. Billiot, 370 So.2d 539 (La. 1979); Lizotte v. State, 247 A.2d 98

oriented fair trial test. 6/ The apparent conflict with the foregoing decision also warrants jurisdiction under Rule 17 and the substantive law.

(Me. 1968); Berry v. State, 345 So.2d 613 (Miss. 1977); State v. Miller, 453, 568 P.2d 130 (1977); Seales v. State, 580 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1979); White v. State, 591 P.2d 266 (Nev. 1979); State v. Edge, 57 N.J. 580, 274 A.2d 42 (1971); Zimmer v. Langlois, 95 R.I. 446, 188 A.2d 89 (1963); State v. Brech, 84 S.D. 177, 169 N.W. 2d 242 (1969); Heinlin v. Smith, 542 P.2d 1081 (Utah, 1975); Hoffer v. Peyton, 207 Va. 302, 149 S.E.2d 893 (1966); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 F.2d 1249 (1979).

6/See Risher v. State, 523 f.2d 421 (Alaska 1974); State v. Watson, 653 F.2d 351 (Ariz. 1982); People v. Pope, 152 Cal. rptr. 732, 590 F.2d 859 (1979); State v. Clark, 170 Conn. 273, 365 A.2d 1167 (1976); People v. Greer, 79 Ill.2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v. Kees, 32 Ill. 2d 299 at 305, 205 N.E. 2d 729 (1965); Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 364 N.E. 2d 1269 (1977); White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 248 N.W. 2d 281 (1976); Johnson v. State, 620 P.2d 11 (Okla. Cr. 1980); Orona v. State, 638 F.2d 1077 (N.M. 1982); State v. Sanchez, 652 P. 2d 1232 (N.M. 1982); People v. DeGraffenried, 19 Mich. App. 702, 173 N.W. 2d 317 (1969); Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d

Based on the material facts presented herein, the Eleventh Circuit squarely held that King's lawyer rendered ineffective representation at the sentencing phase of the trial and that the representation created both factual and substantial disadvantage to the course of the defense and a great likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial.

That holding was predicated upon, as best as an analysis yields, two conclusions. The first was that counsel did not do enough preparation for the penalty phase of trial as this produced only one witness in mitigation on King's behalf.

---

810 (Tex. Crim. 1977); State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 341 N.E. 2d 304 (1976). See, also, Seales v. State, 580 S.W. 2d 733 (Mo. 1979) (applying fair trial and Eighth Circuit, "reasonable competent attorney" test); Woody v. United States, 369 A.2d 592 (D.C. App. 1977) ("gross imcompetence" test applied to claim raised after trial); Harris v. State, 293 A.2d 291 (Del. Sup. 1972) ("genuine and

The second conclusion was that certain remarks of counsel during sentencing left King without an advocate to plead his case.

The Eleventh Circuit apparently depends on the notion that a substantial amount of mitigating evidence surrounds any capital defendant. If a lawyer doesn't discover and produce every shred of evidence, he is presumptively ineffective under the constitution. The court's conclusion that defense counsel failed to conduct exhaustive investigation into the preparation of cumulative character witnesses for the sentencing proceeding

---

effective representation" test); Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 543 P..2d 881 (1973) ("complete absence of counsel" test); Schoonover v. State, 2 Kan. App. 2d 481, 582 P. 2d 292 (1978); People v. Garrow, 51 App. Div. 2d 814, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1976) ("farce and mockery"); Lewis v. State, 369 So.2d 542 (Ala. App. 1978), cert. den. 367 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1978) ("sham" test); In Re Cronin, 133 Vt. 234, 336 A. 2d 164 (1975) ("mockery of justice").

has absolutely no support in the record. Defense counsel presented the testimony of King's minister that he was a good worker and a non-violent person. (R2028- 2030) In addition, counsel referred to Phillip Carol's testimony that King had been one of the best workers he ever had. (R1318, 1321-1322, 2030) Finally, trial counsel informed the jury that Attorney David Kurland, who respresented King on the charge for which he was placed at the correctional center, considered King to be a non-violent person. (R2031)

While Assistant Public Defender Rondolino said he checked Cole's files and found a list of six character witnesses who should have been called, his opinion was based on pure speculation and should have been rejected. First, Rondolino did not know what Cole did in the way of contacting witnesses. He was never able to state that there were, in fact, any other

witnesses available; if they would have testified; what they would have testified to; and whether their testimony would have been beneficial to King. Clearly, King did not meet his burden of persuasion in establishing that counsel was ineffective and that his actions worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage. Washington v. Strickland, supra.

The two uncalled character witnesses (Scott and Brown) who were called to testify at the 3.850 hearing, both stated that they were present at King's sentencing hearing at trial counsel's request. (See TR236, 240-241) Cole was certainly aware of their existence, having subpoenaed them to court, however, he did not have them testify for two very good reasons. First, their testimony would have been merely cumulative to what the jury heard. Second, Brown's testimony would have actually been prejudicial to

King. Counsel's failure to present these witnesses was certainly a tactical decision, and cannot be said to have caused King actual substantial prejudice. (A.96-97)

There is nothing in the instant record to support the court's finding that defense counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare the sentencing portion of the trial. While Cole initially requested a night to relax, moments later counsel informed the judge that he only needed thirty minutes to get his witnesses together. (R2016) The trial judge then granted a brief recess (R2018), after which the sentencing hearing continued. Again, King has failed to demonstrate that he sustained actual prejudice.

The panel also considered the closing remarks of counsel at sentencing as demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. For something so dramatically

apparent, it is noteworthy that United States District Judge William Castanga also reviewed this issue and found the claim was clearly without merit. Also, when the claim was initially presented to the Florida Supreme Court, a unanimous court did not consider meritorious to any degree the suggestion now made that trial counsel's closing ". . .argument may have done more harm than good . . ." The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion was based on one isolated portion of counsel's argument which has been taken totally out of context. There was absolutely nothing wrong with defense counsel's being candid with the jury. The jury had just convicted King of the perverted sexual attack upon a sixty-eight year old woman, stabbing her to death and then setting her house on fire to destroy the evidence. It surely cannot be said that this was <u>not</u> a

horrible crime. To argue otherwise would surely have lessened counsel's credibility. Cole's argument can only be reasonably construed as an attempt to get a life recommendation. Counsel simply wanted to assure the jury that although they found King guilty of first degree murder, he would not get work release or be freed if they would spare his life. This point was made to rebut the State attorney's argument that King would soon be back on the streets. (R2031-2035)

In Washington v. Strickland, supra, the en banc panel required that a petitioner must show that ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of the defense. It was considered that this burden would eliminate the filing of frivolous or unsubstantial claims and at the same time would allow the state to

show that if any constitutional error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the Eleventh Circuit relieved King of showing any real prejudice whatsoever, much less actual and substantial. In the court's opinion, it is suggested that additional mitigating evidence in the form of other witnesses existed and should have been presented; however, the court obviously chose not to examine the value of the evidence. This type of analysis appears to utilize the same kind of "conceivable benefit" test which was specifically rejected in Washington v. Strickland, en banc, referring to United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 3440 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). Additionally, that notion appears to border on the ridiculous when one of the

two witnesses' (Willie Brown) testimony is examined. In addition to testifying what a fine fellow King was, he would have also added that King had a reputation in the ommunity for burglaries and break-ins. That particular factor is one which any competent attorney would have sought to keep away from the jury's knowledge and consideration.

Here, as in Strickland v. Washington, is the specific question of what the Sixth Amendment requires in a criminal trial. Whether the standard of the Eleventh Circuit is correct or whether any other standard is correct, or whether this Court will set forth an entirely different standard is something which necessarily will have direct and equal application to this case. Likewise, as in Strickland v. Washington, supra, several other issues dealing with the inte pretation and

application of decisions of this Court, the burden and degree of proof when considering the issue of assistance of counsel, and the function of a federal appellate court with regards to findings of fact by lower federal and state courts are involved. Whatever is decided as to these issues will also have a controlling bearing on this case.

Another source of conflict has developed because the Eleventh Circuit in this cause and others 7/ has permitted defendants to drag the federal courts into the substantive state sentencing process.

7/ In Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, at 1262, n. 54 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. pending, U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 83-113, the Court expressly repudiated the principle explained in Spinkellink and applied in Barclay, Stephens and Barefoot:

> "In view of Godfrey, we can only conclude that the language in

Compare, Barclay v. Florida, ___U.S. __ 103 S.Ct. 3418 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, __ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983); see also, Barefoot v. Estelle, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3383 (1983); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 at 613-614 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 976 (1979). The extraordinary review of the death penalty is not the function of the habeas corpus writ or this Court and its inferior courts. Although the present sentence has been reviewed by four state courts of competent jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has totally ignored the state courts' review under the guise that the major issue, competency of trial counsel, presents a "mixed question of law

---

the Spinkellink opinion precluding federal courts from reviewing state courts' application of capital sentencing criteria is no longer sound precedent."

and fact." The only inquiry should have been whether the proceeding below was fundamentally unfair. 8/ It was not, and therefore under Barclay, Zant. and Barefoot, there is neither authority nor cause to review the present sentence further.

A federal court's intrusion into a state's capital sentencing process is warranted where a defendant can plainly show, "that the factor and circumstances of his case are so clearly undeserving of capital punishment that to impose it would be patently unjust and would shock the conscience." Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 548 F.2d 606, n. 28, Such is not even remotely the situation in the case at bar

8/ Petitioner would further submit that the question of whether trial counsel fell below the range of a competent attorney is only a question of fact, and not a mixed question of law and fact. Cf. Lavellee v. Dellee Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203,

as is evident upon the face of the record.

Contrary to Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Eleventh Circuit has not given any substantive consideration to the presumptively valid determinations by both the Supreme Court of Florida and the State trial court that Cole was not ineffective on the face of the record. The State courts applied the proper standard of "fundamental fairness" and their determinations are soundly supported by a competent record which should not have been disturbed. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Sumner v. Mata, supra. The Eleventh Circuit discarded these carefully considered opinions by totally ignoring them.

---

35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973); Maggio v. Fulford, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. ___, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Marshall v. Lumberger, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. ___, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).

VII

CONCLUSION

For the same reasons that this Court granted certiorari review in Washington v. Strickland, Case No. 82-1554, the Court should accept and decide this case and thus resolve the ever-growing conflict that exists between the highest court of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted on this _____ day of January, 1984.

JIM SMITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

MICHAEL J. KOTLER
Assistant Attorney General
Park Trammell Building
1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 272-2670

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, JR.,

Respondent-Appellee

No. 82-5306

United States Court of Appeals
Eleventh Circuit

September 2, 1983

State death row inmate, who was incarcerated on conviction of first-degree murder, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, William J. Castagna, J., denied petition, and petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Roney, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) habeas petitioner had not met burden of establishing ineffective representation at guilt phase of trial; (2) lead

counsel's closing argument, in combination with counsel's failure to present available mitigating evidence, denied petitioner effective assistance of counsel at penalty stage of trial; (3) exclusion of venire member for cause was proper; (4) district court could properly decide issue of ineffectiveness without hearing; (5) consolidation of indicted and information charges did not, by itself, make trial fundamentally unfair; and (6) refusal to permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they favored mandatory death penalty for certain crimes did not deny petitionr a fair trial.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

1. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(1)

Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendant the right to counsel reasonably

likely to render, and rendering, reasonably effective assistance. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

2. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(1)

In judging whether Sixth Amendment Standard of reasonably effective assistance of counsel has been met, totality of circumstances and entire record must be considered. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

3. HABEAS CORPUS 85.2(2)

Burden is on habeas corpus petitioner to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel and prejudice. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

4. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(1)

Whether effective assistance of counsel has been afforded is mixed question of law and fact. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

5. HABEAS CORPUS 85.1(2)

Historical or primary facts found by

state courts are entitled to presumption of correctness in habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.

6. HABEAS CORPUS 25.1(6)

To establish prejudice flowing from any ineffectiveness of trial counsel, habeas corpus petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to course of his defense, but need not show that this disadvantage determined outcome of entire case. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

7. HABEAS CORPUS 85.5(9)

Habeas petitionr had not met burden of establishing ineffective representation at guilt phase of trial, even if defense counsel did not anticipate consolidation of indicted charges with information charges, and notwithstanding testimony of

support counsel and another attorney, as well as statements by lead counsel himself, to effect that lead counsel was exhausted, where alleged deficiencies in counsel's preparation were not supported by record or law, petitioner did not represent that FBI agent, who stated on proffer that he found no hairs of negro origin in victim's pubic sample or in ambulance within which she had been wrapped, had in fact found nonnegroid hair, counsel got medical examiner to acknowledge that she could not determine whether paring knife found on petitioner's person caused victim's injury, and counsel emphasized in closing argument that victim's friend could not identify knife as belonging to victim. 28 U.S.C.A. §§2254, 2254(d); Const. Amend. 6; West's F.S.A.R. Cr.P. Rule 3.250.

8. CRIMINAL LAW. 641.13(2)

Counsel may be effective even if he spends only short period of time with his client prior to trial. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 6.

9. HABEAS CORPUS 85.1(2)

Finding of Florida Supreme Court that defense counsel was ready to try indicted and information charges together was entitled to presumption of correctness by federal court on habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

10. CRIMINAL LAW. 641.13(2)

Even if lead counsel was extremely tired, such alone did not estalbish ineffectiveness; there ahd to be some showing he committed errors because of his condition. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

11. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(1)

A tired lawyer is not necessarily an

ineffective lawyer. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

12. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(6)

Decisions as to whether to call witnesses to stand and whether to ask particular questions must be viewed as tactical matters, for purpose of determining question of effective assistance. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

13. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(7)

Counsel's duty to his client extends beyond guilt stage of trial to sentencing proceedings. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

14. CRIMINAL LAW 641.13(7)

Lead counsel's closing argument, in combination with counsel's failure to present available mitigating evidence, denied defendant effective assistance of counsel at penalty stage of trial where counsel unnecessarily stressed horror of crime and

counsel's status as appointed representative in closing argument and, in effect, separated himself from his client, conveying to jury that he had reluctantly represented a defendant who had committed a reprehensible crime. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

15. CRIMINAL LAW 998(3)

Under Florida law, defendant's failure to raise challenge to imposition of death penalty on conviction under felony-murder rule precluded consideration of issue on motion for collateral relief. West's F.S.A. §782.04(1).

16. HABEAS CORPUS 45.3(1)

Failure to bring up issue on appeal, no less than at trial, may preclude federal habeas corpus review. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.

17. HABEAS CORPUS 25.1(1)

Where habeas corpus petitioner proffered no justification for failure to raise challenge to imposition of death penalty on conviction under felony-murder rule on direct appeal and on appeal from denial of collateral relief motion, his unexcused procedural default prevented Court of Appeals from reaching merits of claim on habeas corpus review. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; West's F.S.A. §782.04(1)

18. HABEAS CORPUS 25.1(8)

State death row inmate, who unsuccessfuly sought collateral relief in state court based on Florida Supreme Court's alleged use of nonrecord material in reviewing death sentences, and who lacked any specific evidence that Florida Supreme Court actually relied on nonrecord material in his case, was precluded from attacking Florida court's alleged practice

in federal court. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.

19. JURY 83(1)

Venire member, who specifically stated that she could not be impartial as to guilt or innocence, rather than as to sentence, was properly excluded for cause.

20. HABEAS CORPUS 59

Habeas corpus petitioner is not entitled to hearing or ineffectiveness if state court record is sufficient. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

21. HABEAS CORPUS 59

Where state court had held evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness claim at which two potential character witnesses who were not called at trial and two attorneys, including support counsel, had testified for defendant, and habeas petitioner did not suggest what additional evidence he hoped to develop before

district court, such court could properly decide ineffectiveness issue on petition for habeas corpus without a hearing. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

22. HABEAS CORPUS 90

Although it is often advisable for district court to provide brief explanation of its disposition of each claim on petition for habeas corpus, such practice is not required where court rejects claims which it regards as frivolous or totally without merit. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.

23. HABEAS CORPUS 92(1)

Federal habeas court had to accept findings of state court, in denying defendant's motion to suppress at trial, as to credibility of defendant and arresting officers, just as any appellate court must accept findings of trial court where credibility choices are involved. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.

24. CRIMINAL LAW 619

Consolidation of attempted murder and escape charges, arising out of incident involving prison counselor, with arson, robbery, involuntary sexual battery and murder charges, arising out of incident involving resident of house adjacent to correctional center, did not, by itself, make trial fundamentally unfair. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

25. JURY 131(8)

Refusal to permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they favored a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes did not deny defendant a fair trial. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

Convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, Amos Lee King, Jr. appeals the federal district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises a number of arguments as to both conviction and sentence. Although we affirm on all issues raised as to the conviction, we hold that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase. We discuss King's other claims going to the validity of the sentence, as to which we find no error. As to these latter points, we affirm.

In March of 1977, King was an inmate at Tarpon Springs Community Correctional Center, a minimum security work release facility, where he was serving a sentence

for larceny of a firearm. On March 17 he worked at a Clearwater restaurant from 5:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. the following morning. An inmate van picked him up at around 1:30 am., and he checked back into the facility at approximately 2:35 a.m. At about 3:40 a.m., the prison counselor, James McDonough, discovered King missing during a routine bed check. McDonough found King outside the building with blood on his pants. After McDonough escorted King back into the facility, a fight broke out between the two in which King repeatedly stabbed McDonough with a knife. King then fled the facility.

In the meantime a fire had broken out at a house approximately 1,500 feet from the correctional center. Police arrived at around 4:05 a.m. and discovered the dead body of Natalie Brady. She had

received numerous injuries, including two stab wounds, bruises, and a ragged tear of the vagina which apparently had been caused by blood-stained knitting needles found at the scene. There was evidence of forced sexual intercourse. Arson investigators concluded the fire had been set intentionally sometime between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m.

King voluntarily turned himself in that afternoon. He was indicted for the first degree murder of Natalie Brady, arson, robbery of her home, and involuntary sexual battery. He also was separately charged in a direct information with the attempted murder of McDonough and escape from prison. Over the objection of King's counsel, the indictment and information offenses were consolidated into one case for trial.

The government presented strong circumstantial evidence of King's guilt on the murder charge. The medical examiner who performed an autopsy on the deceased, for example, testified that King's blood type was present in Brady's vaginal washings. She stated that if Brady's assailant had raped her with his pants on after causing the tear to the wall of her vagina, blood would have been present on the clothing, as McDonough had found on the crotch area of King's pants. She testified the paring knife used by King to assault McDonough was "consistent" with the wounds found on Brady, but she admitted she could not say this knife caused the wound. A knife salesman testified that the paring knife was manufactured by the same company and was similar in design to the other kitchen knives found in

Brady's house. An old friend of the deceased testified that the paring knife resembled one Brady kept in her house.

The jury found King guilty of all the offenses alleged, including the first degree murder charge, and recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989, 101 S.Ct. 1529, 67 L.Ed.2d 825 (1981). The Florida courts also denied collateral relief after an evidentiary hearing. King v. State, 407 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1981). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida then denied King's petition for federal habeas corpus relief in an unpublished opinion, but issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal. This appeal

ensued.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In order to understand the basis on which we hold counsel to have been ineffective at the penalty stage of the trial, it is helpful to discuss petitioner's arguments as to the guilt phase.

[1 - 3] The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel reasonably likely to render, and rendering, reasonably effective assistance. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 394 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1982); Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 278 - 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981). In judging whether this standard has been met, the totality of circumstances and the entire record must be

considered. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 804 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1981). The burden is on the habeas corpus petitioner to establish ineffectiveness and prejudice. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d __ (1983).

[4, 5] Whether effective assistance has been afforded is a mixed question of law and fact. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341 - 42, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 - 15, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Harris v. Oliver, 645 F.2d 327, 330, n. 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 687, 70 L.Ed.2d 650 (1981). Therefore this Court has held that a state

court's determination of constitutionally effective assistance is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d), and that the federal district court's determination is not protected by the clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 804 (11th Cir. 1982). Of course, the historical or primary facts found by the stae courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness in a 28 U.S.C.A. §2254 proceeding in federal court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 721 - 22 (5th Cir. 1976).

King was represented by two attorneys from the local public defender's office, Thomas Cole and Anthony Rondolino. Cole, now deceased, was lead counsel, with

Rondolino joining the case one week before trial. Although both attorneys were experienced in criminal defense work, neither had handled a death case before.

At the outset, we note that unlike most of the ineffectiveness cases that come before us in this case two competent attorneys testified at an evidentiary hearing before the state trial court on the motion for collateral relief that King's counsel was not adequate to afford the defendant a fair trial. The state produced no testimony to the contrary. The two testifying attorneys were support counsel Rondolino and Pat Doherty, a Florida defense attorney experienced in death cases. The state judge, who had presided at King's trial, allowed Doherty to proffer his testimony, but ruled it inadmissible because Doherty's standard for judging ineffectiveness did not comport with that of the Florida Supreme

Court, as enunciated in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). The Florida Supreme Court did consider Doherty's proffered testimony, however, King v. State, 407 So.2d at 905, and therefore we do also, without relying on this Circuit's rejection of the Knight standard. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1267 n.10 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d __(1983). Doherty's testimony, like Rondolino's, is part of the record on appeal.

Guilt Stage

The picture of lead counsel Cole painted by Rondolino and Doherty is of a skilled crimnal attorney who for a variety of reasons, some of which were beyond his control, was not ready to proceed to trial. Doherty, who was a friend of

Cole's and was at the time of trial in the same Public Defender's office as Cole, testified, for example, that Cole was exhausted during the trial. Cole had been working on a separate criminal case involving a defendant named Scott. The Scott case ended in acquittal 11 days before King's trial began. Doherty testified as to the effect of the Scott case on preparation for King's defense.

> . . . Mr. Cole fervently believed in this person's [Scott's] innocence, this man protested his innocence at every turn in the road. This was probably the biggest case Tom Cole ever had as a criminal lawyer. He worried about it day and night and it was in that set of circumstances that the Amos Lee King case was being prepared, if it was being prepared.
>
> In other words, what I am saying to you, at every turn in the road, Amos King's case was being overshadowed by the Scott case. It was a consuming interest of Mr. Cole.

Rondolino, who resided with Cole at the time, confirmed Doherty's account of Cole's engulfing involvement in the Scott case. The trial record reveals Cole's stating on one occasion, "Judge, I am beat, I have got to go home and get some sleep", and stating on another occasion, "I can't think any more." One tangible example of how the Scott case seems to have adversely affected Cole's preparation for the King case is the course of defense depositions of government witnesses. Most of the depositions were taken between the first Scott trial, which resulted in a mistrial, and the second. At least 26 were taken in one day and 11 on another. Other depositions were not taken until after King's trial had begun.

Rondolino described another adverse factor in the preparation for the trial.

Four days before trial, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to permit the state to move for consolidation. On the morning of the scheduled trial in both cases, the state made such a motion, which the court granted over defense counsel's objection. Rondolino and Cole told the trial judge they were prepared to proceed with either case that day, but not with both together. Cole stated, "Judge, as an officer of the court, I cannot give Amos King a fair trial today or this week." The defense, which had received two previous continuances, asked for another, which the court denied.

Rondolino indicated at trial and at the subsequent hearing that the consolidation without a continuance threw defense strategy out of whack. At trial he stated:

> . . . since I have been working with Mr. Cole in this case, it has been the consensus of our opinion that we were going to proceed one at a time on these cases. Mr. Cole and I had planned the cases in that light, and it puts a totally different face on the case when both of them are consolidated. For instance, tactics as far as introduction of evidence, objections to be made in regard to testimony of witnesses about the surrounding facts, what we plan to present, just numerous, numerous things, Judge, and if we are going to be forced to go ahead and go to trial this week on a consolidated case, we are just not prepared, Judge, for the record . . ..

He elaborated at the collateral relief hearing, explaining that the defense attorneys felt they could present a viable defense to the indicted charges involving the Brady incident without presenting any affirmative defense by simply pointing out holes in the government's case, but that this "beyond a reasonable doubt" strategy became unviable when the charges involving

the McDonough incident were consolidated.

There are some indications in the record, however, that defense counsel may have foreseen the possibility of a consolidation. In direct conflict with the statements of defense counsel, a state attorney represented to the trial judge that, in his frequent conversations with the defense attorneys, they indicated they planned on a consolidated trial. The judge recalled that two weeks before trial when defense counsel obtained a continuance "it was represented to me . . . that all of the cases were going to be tried at one time." On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that defense counsel "was prepared to try all offenses on the trial date." King v. State, 390 So.2d at 318.

At trial, Cole suggested another difficulty counsel experienced in preparing

for trial. Cole and Rondolino moved to withdraw as counsel, with Cole stating:

> . . . the defendant, Mr. King, does not have confidence or is not satisified with the representation that I have made in his behalf, and I feel that because of his lack of confidence that he has in me, that I cannot effectively communicate with him to prepare adequately to represent him today, and would renew my motion to withdraw at this time . . .

King, who also testified at the evidentiary hearing, stated that Cole met with him only twice prior to trial. Cole told the trial judge at a pretrial hearing, however, that he had spoken with his client four or five time.

A number of failures by counsel during the trial raise some question as to ineffectiveness. Cole, for example, failed to bring up on cross-examination the weakness in the testimony of a key government witness. Alma Tarpley, the

deceased's old friend, testified that she had seen a knife similar to that used by King in the attack on McDonough in Brady's kitchen on Anclote Road. Earlier testimony revealed that Brady had lived on a different street since around 1960. Thus defense counsel could have called attention to the fact that Tarpley had not seen the knife she claimed to be similar for about fifteen years. Cole did not cross-examine Tarpley, but he did stress in closing argument that Tarpley could not identify the knife as belonging to Brady.

Similarly, Cole failed to challenge, as scientifically plausible, the statement by the medical examiner, Joan Wood, that the paring knife used by King to attack the guard and allegedly Brady was "consistent" with Brady's wounds. Cole got Wood to acknowledge on cross-examination,

however, that she could not determine this particular type of knife caused the injury, and he emphasized this point in closing argument. Testifying at the hearing that he had never heard any witness imply a knife could be matched to a wound, Doherty stated Cole could have further destroyed Wood's testimony.

Perhaps more significantly, counsel failed to present a piece of potentially exculpatory evidence. An FBI agent, Robert Neill, had examined a sample of Brady's pubic hair, her nightgown and the ambulance sheets within which she had been wrapped. He testified briefly on direct to establish a chain in the custody of certain exhibits, but when Cole began cross-examining him about his findings, the court sustained an objection to the questions as beyond the scope of direct.

On proffer, he stated he found no hairs of negro origin in the pubic sample or in the sheets. He found a dark human hair fragment on the nightgown but could not identify it as to race. Cole did not call Neill on direct, even after learning this information.

The lower state court which held the evidentiary hearing did not reject, as establishing historical facts, any of the evidence presented by King. Since the evidence was uncontradicted, it can be assumed the court simply determined, as a matter of law, that these facts and the trial record did not demonstrate counsel was ineffective. The state judge, who had preside at King's trial, stated immediately upon the close of the evidence at the collateral attack hearing:

> The motion that has been filed by the Defendant, that being the

> 3.850 motion, is denied, the Court having found, based upon having heard the testimony, presided over the trial, observed counsel for the Defendant during the trial, having had the opportunity of Mr. Cole as part of this record here today, reasonably prior to this trial, not immediately prior but reasonably prior, having had the opportunity of receiving an acquittal for his client after a prior mistrial in a very horrendous murder an I certainly do not argue with the jury's verdict. But for the purposes of these comments are just to advise you and your client is that even based upon what I have heard here today, and based upon the law of this state as I understand it to be, that there has not been shown that your client was ineffectively represented by counsel.
>
> To the contrary, again based upon not only what I heard during the trial, but what I heard here today, I think that the record would conclusively show that the Defendant is entitled to no relief.

The law of Florida relied upon by the trial court was undoubtedly that set forth in the leading Florida ineffectiveness

case, Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), which had been decided some ten months before the state collateral hearing.

The Supreme Court of Florida, performing its review function, likewise did not reject any of the facts presented at the state hearing. Accepting all of the evidence, including Doherty's testimony, the court also applied the Knight standard:

> The trial judge found that Cole provided effective assistance of counsel. Our review of the evidence fails to disclose otherwise. We fail to find any single act of omission of commission, or any series or combination thereof, that was a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel. Even if Doherty's testimony to the contrary is accepted, no act, or combination of acts, was substantial enough to demonstrate prejudice to the defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood that any substandard conduct affected the outcome of the

court proceedings. See Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981).

407 So.2d at 905

From the district court's opinion and order, it appears that it also analyzed specific allegations concerning the omissions and conduct of counsel in terms of the likelihood that they affected the outcome of the proceedings. The district court said: "nowhere does it appear that to have undertaken to act as the Petitioner now claims his trial counsel should have acted would have changed the verdict or the sentence."

[6] After these courts had decided this case, this Circuit rejected the Knight standard so that ineffectiveness, or more precisely the prejudice flowing from any ineffectiveness, must be measured under the test emunciated in Washington v.

Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d __ (1983). Under that test, the habeas corpus petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's ineffectiveness "resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense" but need not show that this "disadvantage determined the outcome of the entire case." 693 F.2d at 1262.

[7] Even under this less stringent standard, however, King is not entitled to relief. The alleged deficiencies in counsel's preparation are supported neither by a close reading of the record nor by the law. For example, the record does not substantiate King's argument that Cole never deposed a few key government witnesses. Support counsel testified that he records of the public defender's office

showed no transcribed depositions for nine government witnesses but he acknowledged that depositions are often not transcribed. He could not say for sure, and there is no other probative evidence, that a single government witness had not been deposed. In fact, it is evident from the record that depositions were taken from at least the vast majority of potential government witnesses. Although some of the depostions were taken after trial commenced, Doherty testified that he had done the same thing in some cases and that this practice is not a fatal defect in a murder trial.

Similarly unavailing is King's claim that Cole's preparation suffered because of his consuming involvement in the Scott case. The trial in that case ended eleven days before the King trial began. The

only tangible evidence suggesting the Scott case adversely affected the representation of King is that many of the depostions in the King case were taken during a two-day period between the first Scott trial, which ended in a mistrial, and the second. King does not suggest any beneficial facts Cole would have learned if he had taken the depositions in a less rushed manner.

[8] Neither the law nor the record substantiates King's claim that he met with counsel only twice prior to trial. Cole told the trial judge he had spoken with his client on four or five occasions, and, even if King's testimony is credited, counsel may be efective even if he spends only a short period of time with his client. Jones v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414, 416 - 17 (5th Cir. 1979); Howard v.

Beto, 466 F.2d 1356, 1357 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956, 93 S.Ct. 1428, 35 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973).

[9] There are two problems with King's assertion that counsel was not prepared to try together the indicated charges of murder, robbery, arson and involuntary sexual battery with the information charges of attempted murder and escape. First, the trial judge, who was in a far better position to know the truth than this Court, evidently believed defense counsel had foreseen a consolidation. He indicated the parties had told him the charges would be tried together. The Florida Supreme Court viewed the record similarly, stating that the charges had been treated together in pretrial proceedings. That court's finding that defense counsel was ready to try all the charges

together is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981).

Second, the Florida Supreme Court, the final arbiter of state law, stated that the evidence of the attempted murder and escape would have been admissible in a separate trial of only the indictment offenses. King v. State, 390 So.2d at 318. Thus, even if defense counsel did not anticipate consolidation, it is hard to see how this lack of forresight prejudiced King.

[10, 11] The testimony of Randolino and Doherty that Cole was exhausted and the statements by Cole himself to that effect during trial certainly give us some pause. But even if Cole was extremely tired, this alone does not establish ineffectiveness. There must be some showing

he committed errors because of his condition. A tired lawyer is not necessarily an ineffective lawyer.

King essentially points to three supposed errors by counsel during trial: the failure to call FBI agen Neill on direct, and the failure to do more to refute the testimony of two government witnesses, Tarpley and Wood. Neill's testimony would have been of substantial benefit to King only if he had found a non-Negroid hair, not belonging to the victim, in the material he examined. Brady was undoubtedly sexually assaulted and murdered. The only question at trial was whether King was the perpetrator of the crimes. The absence of any hair of any racial origin simply would not have been probative of whether a black man was the guilty party.

Cole did not ask Neill whether he had

found a non-Negroid hair, perhaps because Cole knew the answer from the FBI report which he apparently had. King does not represent to us that Neill had in fact found a non-Negroid hair. Thus King has not established that the failure to call Neill caused King to lose any valuable testimony.

[12] With respect to Wood, the medical examiner who testified that the paring knife was "consistent" with the wounds found on the victim, it cannot be assumed that Cole could have obtained an expert witness to refute Wood's testimony. Even if counsel could have found a rebuttal witness, by presenting the testimony he would have lost the right to both the first and last closing arguments. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.250. In any event, Cole got Wood to acknowledge on cross-examination

that she could not determine this particular knife caused the injury, and he stressed this point in closing argument. Especially given these circumstances, decisions as to whether to call witnesses to the stand and whether to ask particular questions must be viewed as tactical matter. United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 961, 28 L.Ed.2d 228 (1971).

As to Tarpley, the deceased's friend who testified that the knife allegedly used by King resembled one of Brady's, Cole emphasized in closing argument that Tarpley could not identify the knife as belonging to Brady. Thus, once again, Cole did remove much, if not all, of the sting from the government witness' testimony.

In short, King has not met his burden to establish ineffective representation at the guilt phase of the trial.

Penalty Stage

[13] Counsel's duty to his client extends beyond the guilt stage of the trial to the sentencing proceeding. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 963 (11th Cir. 1983). King argues that lead counsel Cole was ineffective at the penalty phase of the trial because he failed to present available character witnesses and made a weak closing argument.

There are indications in the record that counsel failed to conduct an exhaustive investigation for potential mitigating evidence. Prior to the penalty stage, Cole told the trial judge he had not discussed this part of the trial with his client and asked for a one-day continuance

so he could speak to possible defense witnesses. The court denied the request. Although King apparently furnished his lawyer with a list of six possible character witnesses, there is no indication he contacted all of them to determine whether their testimony might be helpful.

Nonetheless, Cole did present some mitigating evidence on behalf of his client. Cole called one character witness, a minister and former employer of King in the gardening business, who testified that King was a good worker whom he never knew to be violent during the twenty years they were acquainted. Cole also called the jury's attention to the testimony during the guilt phase of the trial of two witnesses: King's employer at the restaurant, who described the defendant as

an excellent employee, and the head of the correctional center, who termed the defendant a good inmate without disciplinary problems. In addition, Cole informed the jury of a converstaion he had had with King's former attorney, who indicated he viewed the defendant as unintelligent and uneducated, but not violent.

In support of his claim that Cole should have presented additional mitigating evidence, King called two long-term acquaintances at the state post-conviction relief hearing. Both witnesses stated they had attended the trial, apparently at the requst of defense counsel, but had not been called to testify. They indicated that if called they would have confirmed that King was a good, non-violent person and a trustworthy employee. One of the acquaintances acknowledged, however, that

King had a reputation for burglaries. He indicated many other people would have testified on defendant's behalf if they had been asked. Support counsel testified at the hearing that additional character witnesses should have been called.

Although Cole presented some mitigating evidence, it is clear that counsel neglected to present other avialable evidence. The record also suggests this failure cannot be deemed a strategic decision taken after a reasonable investigation into the alternatives. This Court has emphasized the importance of pretrial preparation and investigation. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d __ (1983); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d at 804 - 05. cert. denied, __U.S.__.

103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 104 - 05 (5th Cir. 1979). Here, counsel admitted he was unprepared for the penalty stage of the trial, because he had not adequately discussed sentencing with his client nor had he carefully searched for mitigating evidence.

These errors occurred at a particularly critical point in the trial.

> The sentencing stage of any case, regardless of the potential punishment, is "the time at which for many defendants the most important services of the entire proceeding can be performed." ABA Standards on the Administration of Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §5.3(e). The special importance of the capital sentencing proceeding gives rise to a duty on the part of defense counsel to be prepared for that crucial phase of the trial.

Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 963. Although this Court apparently has never

held counsel ineffective in a capital case solely because of failure to present mitigating evidence, see id. at 964, it has on a number of occasions cited this failure as one factor sugesting ineffectiveness. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 1982); Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1976).

As in those cases, counsel here did not merely neglect to present available mitigating evidence. He made a closing argument that may have done more harm than good. In his argument, the main thrust of which was that the defendant if given life would be secured in prison for many years. King's attorney unnecessarily stressed the horror of the crime and counsel's status as an appointed representative:

"It is extremely difficult for me to talk to you at this time. This is the first time that I have ever been in a position like this. I have been practicing law for three years now, Assistant Public Defender and I have never defended a murder case before. I think that you all understand that the job I had to do this week and you can appreciate what I had to do.

You can convict Amos of a cruel and evil crime. There is no doubt about it. Murder upsets me very much and I am also human, I have feelings, I have been to Raiford which is the State Prison.

Now you might not think that Amos deserves to live in our society of civilized people. You might not consider him right now as a human being and what you convicted him of was an evil and gross crime but I am not asking you to put him back out on the streets or take a chance that he will ever be back out there because in Florida the legislature passed a law which means that when you convicted a man of first degree murder if you don't if he is not sent to the elecric chair, then he automatically goes to prison for life and for twenty years he is not eligible for parole. He is not eligible for parole. He will be in

> maximum security at Raiford, not a work release center."

In effect, counsel separated himself from his client, conveying to the jury that he had reluctantly represented a defendant who had committed a reprehensible crime. "[R]eminding a jury that the undertaking is not by choice, but in service to the public, effectively stacks the odds against the accused." Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d at 806, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983). Rather than attempting to humanize King, counsel in his closing argument stressed the inhumanity of the crime.

[14] We hold that this argument in combination with counsel's failure to present available mitigating evidence denied King effective assistance of counsel at the penalty stage of the trial.

Death Penalty Based on Felony Murder

[15 - 17] King argues he could not be constitutinally sentenced to death because he was convicted under the Florida felony murder rule, which does not require a showing of intent to kill. Fla. Stat. Ann. §782.04(1). King did not raise this point to the Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal. Under Florida law, this procedural default precluded consideration of the issue on a motion for collateral relief. Hargrave v. State, 396 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1981). Although King mentioned the point in his motion for post-conviction relief, he did not raise it on appeal from the denial of the collateral relief motion and the Florida Surpeme Court did not discuss the question. The failure to bring up an issue on appeal, no less than at trial, may preclude federal habeas corpus

review. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 at 816 - 17, petition for cert. filed, [No. 82-6923] (U.S. June 14, 1983); Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981); Evans v. Maggio, 557 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1977). King has proffered no justification for not raising the point, so his unexcused procedural default prevents us from reaching the merits of his claim, but it is worth noting that in a similar set of facts we rejected this argument on its merits. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1446 - 47 (11th Cir. 1983).

Non-Record Material Before the Florida Supreme Court (The Brown Issue)

[18] King was one of the Florida death row inmates who unsuccessfully sought collateral relief in state court based on the Florida Supreme Court's alleged use of non-record material in reviewing death sentences. Brown v.

Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 542, 70 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981). His attack in federal court on the Florida court's alleged practice is foreclosed by Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, June 14, 1983 No. 82-6923. King lacks any specific evidence that the Florida Supreme Court actually relied on non-record material in his case.

Restriction on Jury's Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances

Because our decision requires that King be resentenced, we do not need to consider the argument that the trial court's instruction limited the jury's consideration to statutory mitigating circumstances, in violation of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).

Removal of Prospective Juror Who Opposed the Death Penalty: The Witherspoon Issue

King argues that the trial court violated Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), by excusing for cause venire member Holenda. In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that veniremen cannot be excluded for cause "simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Id. at 522, 88 S.Ct. 1777. The Court carefully admonished, however:

> . . . that nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who make unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the

> trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt . . ..

Id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21 (emphasis in original); accord Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).

[19] A careful review of the colloquy between the trial judge and venire member Holenda reveals that the second basis for exclusion provided in Witherspoon and Adams applies here: the prospective juror could not be impartial in deciding the defendant's guilt. Because the questions asked of Holenda referred back to questions asked of the last two prospective jurors, the colloquy involving all three must be reviewed.

THE COURT: Again I will direct this question to each of those of you who have just

entered the box: As you are aware, one of the charges against this defendant carries a possible punishment of death in the electric chair. Do any of you have any conscientiously held opinions as to the death penalty that would prevent you from reaching a verdict?

* * * * * *

THE COURT: Mr. Farmer?

VENIREMAN FARMER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: In other words, you do not feel that you could reach a verdict--

VENIREMAN FARMER: Yes, sir. I do not believe in capital punishment.

THE COURT: Well, that's not the--really the question.

VENIREMAN FARMER: Well, if I were to go on and it would be a part of the verdict that gave an advisory for you for death, I could not be a part of it.

THE COURT: Well, here--let me back up a little bit. As to the capital offense, the only--your function there would be to determine whether in fact he was guilty or innocent of the charge. That would be number one, if it would be, and

my question then was, could you find a verdict based upon the testimony and the law as to his guilt or innocence.

VENIREMAN FARMER: Not knowing that the possibility was there, sir, that it would mean death.

THE COURT: All right, sir. You may step down then, Mr. Farmer.

* * * * * *

Frank Carter.

THE COURT: Okay. Now what about possible penalty that could be imposed? Do you have any conscientiously held opinion with respect to capital punishment that would prevent you from reaching a verdict?

VENIREMAN CARTER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: In other words, Mr. Farmer just candidly indicated to the Court that he could never vote--that he could never reach a verdict with respect to an offense such as this. Do you feel that you could reach a verdict based upon the law and evidence?

VENIREMAN CARTER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any reason at this time that you could not serve fairly and impartially?

VENIREMAN CARTER: Not to my knowledge.

THE COURT: Mr. Holenda and Mrs. King, did I ask you these questions also with respect to the penalty?

VENIREWOMAN HOLENDA: You didn't ask. I'm sorry, I don't believe that I could be impartial. I'm against capital punishment.

THE COURT: Well, here again, as I indicated to Mr. Farmer, even though you are against capital punishment, the jury itself would not be imposing the same. You would be asked to reach a verdict based upon the testimony, the evidence, and the law based as to his guilt or innocence as to each of the charges, and then as to the punishment as it relates to capital punishment. You would then be asked to vote to advise the Court as to what they jury feels would be the proper punishment . I would not be bound by your opinion, however.

VENIREWOMAN HOLENDA: I understand, but I do feel strongly about it. I'm sorry, but that's exactly how I feel.

THE COURT: Okay. You may step down.

Venire member Holenda specifically stated she could not be impartial, and viewing the colloquy involving all three jurors, it is clear that the question related to her verdict as to the guilt or

innocence, not her recommendation as to sentence. Accordingly, her exclusion was proper.

Denial of Evidentiary Hearing on Ineffective and Summary Rejection of Issues Other Than Ineffectiveness

King faults the district court for deciding the ineffectieness issue without first affording him an evidentiary hearing. Because of our decision as to ineffectiveness at the penalty phase of the trial, it is unnecessary to discuss King's argument that the district court should have held a hearing on ineffectiveness during the penalty stage.

[20, 21] As to King's claim that an evidentiary hearing should have been held regarding ineffectiveness at the guilt phase of the trial, we would not reverse the district court. In his opinion denying the writ, the district judge noted

that defense counsel had told him a hearing was unnecessary before he ruled on King's motion to stay the judgment. Without deciding whether this amounted to a waiver which extended to a decision on the habeas corpus petition, a habeas corpus petitioner is not entitled to a hearing on ineffectiveness if the state court record is sufficient. Winfrey v. Maggio, 664 F.2d 550, 551 - 52 (5th Cir. 1981). Here a state court had held an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claim at which two potential character witnesses who were not called at trial and two attorneys, including support counsel, had testified for the defendant. King did not suggest what additional evidence he hoped to develop before the district court. The court could properly decide the issue without a hearing.

[22] King also claims the district court should have explained its reasons for rejecting each of his claims, rather than summarily dismissing all except ineffectiveness as "without merit". Although it is often advisable for the district court to provide a brief explanation of its disposition of each claim, this practice is not required where the court "reject[s] claims which it regards as frivolous or totally without merit." Washington v Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1264 n. 34 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d __ (1983) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 548, 101 S.Ct. 764, 769, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)). We have reviewed each claim and, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, affirm the denial of relief based on issues other

than ineffectiveness.

Admission of Statements Made by King

Denying King's motion to suppress, the trial court permitted a police officer to testify about the statements made by King after his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings, including two conflicting statements concerning how he obtained the knife used to attack McDonough. First he told the arresting officers that the knife was his and he had possessed it for weeks. Later he told the officers that it was McDonough's knife which he had taken from McDonough after the prison official had attacked him. King testified at the motion to suppress that he had asked for a lawyer before any questionsing. The police officers gave contrary testimony, indicating that King had not asked for a lawyer until after he had made the

statements about the knife.

The trial court evidently believed the police officers, not King. It excluded only statements made after the time the officers testified King first requested an attorney, expressly finding that all prior statements were freely and voluntarily given.

[23] The federal court must accept the findings of the state court as to the credibility of King and the officers, just as any appellate court must accept the findings of a trial court where credibility choices are involved. See United States v. Kreczmer, 636 F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1981) (credibility choices on motion to suppress are within province of finder of fact); United States v. Howard, 451 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1971) (credibility choice involving conflicting evidence

evidence as to whether police agent gave defendant Miranda warnings is for the trial judge).

Consolidation

[24] King contends the consolidation of the attempted murder and escape charges, arising out of the incident involving prison counselor McDonough, with the arson, robbery, involuntary sexual battery and murder charges, arising out of the incident involving Brady, denied him a fair trial. In concluding that consolidation was proper under state law, the Florida Supreme Court indicated the evidence of the prison incident would have been admissible at the murder trial even without consolidation. King v. State, 390 So.2d at 318. The Florida court also found that defense counsel was prepared to try all charges on the trial date. Id.

This finding of fact is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981), and the Florida Supreme Court is the ultimate source of state law. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d at 810, petition for cert. filed June 14, 1983, No. 826923. The consolidation hardly caused the defendant great prejudice. It certainly, by itself, did not make the trial fundamentally unfair.

Restriction on Defense Questioning During Voir Dire

[25] Sustaining the prosecutor's objection, the trial judge refused to permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they favored a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes. The Florida Supreme Court succinctly explained why this question was irrelevant:

> The purpose of voir dire examination is to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the issues in the cause . . . The subject question, however, did not address the juror[s]'s impartial application of existing law, but rather it concerned [their] conception of what laws should exist.

King v. State, 390 So.2d at 319. All of the jurors who were eventually selected indicated they could reach a decision based on the law and evidence. The restriction on voir dire questioning did not deny King a fair trial.

The denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief is affirmed, insofar as it attacks the constitutionality of the conviction, but reversed as to the death penalty. The case is remanded to the district court for entry of an appropriate writ.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-5603

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, JR., Warden, FLORIDA STATE PENITENTIARY, LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT AND JIM SMITH, Attorney General,

Respondents-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District for the Middle District of Florida

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 9/2/83, 11 Cir. 198_, ____F.2d ____)

(NOVEMBER 4, 1983)

Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

(XXX) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the

Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestion for Reharing En Banc is DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ PAUL H. RONEY

REHG-6
(Rev. 6/82)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-5306

D.C. Docket No. 81-01092

AMOS LEE KING, JR.

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, JR., Warden, Florida State Penitentiary, LOUIS L. WAINWRIGHT, and JIM SMITH, Attorney General,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and was argued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the District Court appealed from, in this cause be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, REMANDED to said District Court in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

September 2, 1982

REISSUED AS MANDATE:

ISSUED AS MANDATE: NOV 16, 1983

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No.81-1092
Civ.-T-WC

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, JR., Warden, Florida State Penitentiary; LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Department of Corrections; and JIM SMITH, Attorney General, State of Florida,

Respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER

The Petitioner, Amos Lee King, seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254.

Amos Lee King was convicted of the murder of Natalie Brady and of the offense of attempted first-degree murder, escape, robbery, involuntary sexual battery and arson. Upon the jury recommendation, the

trial judge imposed the death sentence for the first-degree murder conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death sentence.* King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980). The Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, King v. Florida, 450 U.S. 989 (1981), as was his request for clemency presented to the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida.

On October 9, 1981, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas

* The sentence imposed for the involuntary sexual battery was vacated and the cause was remanded for resentencing for the offense of attempted first degree murder.

County, Florida. On November 4, 1981, the Honorable Robert Graham, Governor of the State of Florida, signed a death warrant authorizing the execution of the Petitioner for some time between December 4, 1981, and Noon, December 11, 181. The Petitioner's execution was ultimately scheduled for December 8, 1981.

An evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to the Petitioner's 3.850 Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on November 13, 1981. Upon consideration of the testimony presented therein, the trial court denied the motion. On that same day, the Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, which set the case for oral argument on December 1, 1981.

On November 27, 181, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Application for Stay of Execution

and a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis in this Court. Hearing on the application was held on December 3, 1981, prior to which time the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the 3.850 motion and denied the Application for Stay of Execution. King v. State of Florida, ___So.2d___ (No. 61,406 Fla. Dec. 2, 1981). On December 4, 1981, this Court entered an Order granting the Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and stayed the Petitioner's execution pending review of the record. After careful review of the entire record, Habeas Corpus relief is denied.

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

At the time the offenses of which the Petitioner was convicted occurred, he was an inmate of the Tarpon Springs Community Correctional Center, a work release facility, serving a sentence for larceny of a

firearm. At approximately 3:40 a.am. on the morning of March 18, 1977, prison counselor James McDonough made a routine bed check and found the Petitioner King absent from his room. Upon searching the building grounds, McDonough found King outside the building. When King came forward into the light, McDonough noticed that the crotch portion of King's light colored pants was covered with blood. The counselor escorted King back to the central room, and when he turned to get handcuffs, King attacked him with a knife. The two struggled and McDonough received over twenty cuts and stab sounds. King left, then returned and attacked McDonough again.

At approximately 4:05 a.m. police and fire personnel arrived at the scene of a fire at the home of Natalie Brady, whose

house was situated approximately 1500 feet from the correctional facility. Natalie Brady was found dead on the back porch.

It appeared that the victim had sustained two stab wounds, various bruises to the chin, and burns on the leg. An autopsy revealed further injuries, including bruises to the back of the head, hemorrhaging of the brain and neck, and broken cartilage in the neck. In addition, there was a severe tear of the vaginal wall, apparently caused by a wooden bloodstained knitting needle found at the scene. There was evidence of forcible intercourse. The Petitioner's blood type was found to be present in the victim's vaginal washings. The County Medical Examiner established the time of death at approximately 3:00 a.m. The arson investigators concluded that the fire was intentionally set some

time between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m.

The grand jury returned an indictment charging King with the first-degree murder of Natalie Brady, arson and robbery. The state attorney filed a direct information charging King with escape and the attempted murder of James McDonough. Both the indictment and information offenses were set for trial on July 5, 1977. The defense would not agree to consolidation. The State initially chose to proceed on the information offenses, but shortly before trial, on the basis of newly amended Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151, the State moved to consolidate. The motion was granted.

The jury found the Petitioner guilty of all offenses charged and recommended the death sentence for the first-degree murder of Natalie Brady. The trial judge immediately imposed the death sentence.

Petitioner asserts the following claims as a basis for habeas corpus relief:

1. Denial of effective assistance of counsel.
2. Receipt by the Florida Supreme Court of psychiatric and psychological information concerning petitioner which was not presented at trial.
3. The alleged arson did not involve great risk of death to many persons as required to comprise an aggravating circumstance for jury consideration.
4. The jury was instructed only as to statutory mitigating circumstances.
5. Defense counsel was unduly limited in jury voir dire.

6. Jurors were improperly excused.

7. Consolidation for trial of two cases against defendant resulted in prejudice to defendant's right to a fair trial.

8. Violation of defendant's right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

9. Death sentence was illegal because it was predicated upon the "felony murder" rule.

Defense counsel argued at the argument on the motion to stay the execution, that the record as it then stood was a sufficient basis for the Court to rule on defendant's contention and therefore an evidentiary hearing was neither required nor held. See Winfrey v. Maggio, 664 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1981).

This Court has reviewed the record in the light of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) and Sumner v. Mata, ___U.S.___, 101 S.Ct. 764 (1981), and finds Petitioner's claims two through eight to have been fully and completely presented to either the trial or appellate courts of Florida. Claim number nine was not raised. This Court has again reviewed those claims as well as claim number nine and finds them to be without merit and not needful of further discussion.

The Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was heard by the state trial court at an evidentiary hearing by way of a motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. The trial court found the Defendant to have had effective assistance of counsel at trial and denied the motion.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial.

This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was the principal ground argued by the Petitioner at the hearing on the application for stay of execution and the ground upon which this Court found it necessary to examine the totality of the circumstances by review of the entire record in order to make an assessment as to whether or not effective assistance of counsel was rendered. See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington v Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1981); Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1980).

Factual determinations made by state courts which are presumed to be correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) do not include mixed questions of law and fact.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.1d 717 (5th Cir. 1976). The resolution of the issue of effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. Washington v. Watkinn, 655 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1981); Harris v. Oliver, 645 F.2d 127 (5h Cir. 1981); Mason v. Balcom, supra. Consequently, it is clear that this Court may not simply adopt the conclusions of the Florida courts that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel because as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

> Regardless of the thoroughness of state fact finding procedures, considerations of comity do not obligate federal courts in habeas corpus cases to defer to state determinations on matters of federal law. The obligation of the federal judge is the opposite; to apply the proper federal constitutional standards based on the underlying facts, although the conclusions drawn from the facts may

> differ from the state court's conclusions. (citations omitted).

West v. State of Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated in part and afirmed in part, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Therefore, although an evidentiary hearing was not necessary, the Court nevertheless has reviewed the instances of alleged incompetence raised by the Petitioner in the light of the entire record and aplied the appropriate federal standards accordingly.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused in a criminal proceeding representation by counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981); Beavers v. Balkcom, 616 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.

3 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 677 (1961). Effective counsel is neither errorless counsel, nor counsel judged ineffective by hindsight. Baty v. Balkcom, supra; Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981); Clark v. Blackburn, 619 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1980); Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the appropriate standard for determining whether an accused was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel requires an inquiry in the actual performance of counsel conducting the defense, based on the totality of the circumstances and the entire record. Baty v. Balkcom, supra; Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Estelle, supra; Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Petitioner was represented at trial by assistant public defender Thomas

Cole, now deceased. Approximately one week prior to trial, assistant public defender Anthony Rondolino joined Cole in representing the Petitioner. The Petitioner argues that neither attorney had worked on a capital case prior to their association with his case. This fact is certainly not controlling as to the Petitioner's claim of incompetence and is minimized by the fact that each attorney had several years of trial experience in the representation of criminal defendants. See United States v. Kelly, 559 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1977).

The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he consulted with Petitioner only two times prior to trial. The record, however, indicates that Thomas Cole told the trial judge at a motion hearing held shortly before the trial that he consulted with

his client four or five times. Despite the contradiction on the record, effective assistance of counsel can be rendered even if counsel spends oly a short time with his client. Jones v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1979); see Howard v. Beto, 466 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973).

The Petitioner contends that no effort "whatsoever" was made by counsel prior to trial to study, verify or refute any of the State's evidence linking the Petitioner to the murder of Natalie Brady. This contention is simply not supported by the record, and constitutes pure speculation on the part of the Petitioner.

The Petitioner notes instances during trial where his counsel could have refuted the testimony of various witnesses if he

had prepared properly. Specifically, one of Natalie Brady's neighbors who testified on direct examination that the paring knife in evidence was similar to ones used by the victim when canning vegetables was not cross-examined by trial counsel. The Petitioner speculates that because trial counsel was ill prepared for the witness' testimony, he failed to bring to the attention of the jury that the witness had seen such a knife in Natalie Brady's kitchen some fifteen years ago. Similarly, the Petitioner points to the uncontroverted testimony of a cutlery salesman that the subject paring knife was similar to ones found in Natalie Brady's kitchen. Furthermore, the Petitioner suggests that by retaining the assistance of an expert, trial counsel could have easily refuted the testimony of the assistant county

medical examiner that the wounds on the deceased's body were consistent with the subject paring knife.

These instances, either viewed individually or collectively, fall far short of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on specific omissions of counsel, such as the failure to investigate potentially mitigating circumstances, the Petitioner must make a showing of prejudice before a finding of inefectiveness is appropriate. See Lovett v. State of Florida, 627 F.2d 706 (5th Cir 1980); Bucklew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515; see also Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980).

No prejudice is either urged or evident with regard to the alleged omissions of counsel for nowhere does it appear that to have undertaken to act as the Petitioner now claims his trial counsel should have acted would have changed the verdict or the sentence. Optimistic projections as to what answers unasked questions would have elicited or as to what results different trial strategy would have produced do not constitute a sufficient basis for a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel. Furthermore, "[t]he decisions as to whether or not to call witnesses to the stand, whether to ask or refrain from asking questions, and the like are tactical determinations. Errors, even egregious ones, in this respect do not provide a basis for post-conviction

relief." United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971). In examining the Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court "decline[d] to evaluate the propriety of trial counsel's actions with the aid of the refractive correction of hindsight." Jones v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1992 (19811; quoted in Winfrey v. Maggio, 664 F.2d 550, 552 5th Cir. 1981). The proper method of examining trial strategy is to review counsel's actual performance based on the totality of the circumstances on the record.

A review of the trial transcript indicates that in his closing argument to the jury, counsel not only addressed the

circumstantial nature of the State's case against the Petitioner, but also made appropriate and specific reference to the alleged weaknesses in the testimony of the three aforementioned witnesses. Specifically, trial counsel noted that while Natalie Brady's neighbor did indicate that the victim had a knife similar to the one in evidence, she could not and did not absolutely identify the subject knife as belonging to Natalie Brady. While the knife in evidence was similar in make to ones found in Natalie Brady's kitchen, trial counsel pointed out that the cutlery salesman did not testify that the knives were part of a set. Moreover, although the medical examiner testified that the wounds on the victim were consistent with the blade of the knife in evidence, trial

counsel observed that she also admitted on direct examination that a blade from two to three inches could have made the same wounds. While trial counsel could have called expert witnesses to testify, it is arguable whether they would have contributed any more to the Petitioner's defense. There was no reason to call experts to the stand especially if by doing so trial counsel would have forefeited the Petitioner's right to both first and last closing arguments pursuant to Fla.R. Crim. P. 3.250. The tactical decision to offer no testimony in order to gain the right to final closing argument cannot be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel. Conyers v. Wainwright, 309 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1970).

The Petitioner further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to call FBI agent Robert Neill to the stand to testify to certain allegedly excuplatory evidence. The Petitioner predicates this conclusion on the fact that Agent Neill testified, outside the presence of the jury, that no identifiable negroid hairs were found on either the victim or the sheets in which the body was wrapped and on the likely probability that hairs from the attacker would be found on the victim. The Petitioner fails to note, however, that if Agent Neill would have been called as a defense witness he would have also testified that no identifiable caucasian hairs were found on either the victim's body or the sheets, leaving the allegedly exculpatory testimony without

any evidentiary significance. In addition, Agent Neill would have testified that a dark human hair was found on the victim's nightgown which could have been of negroid origin. It can hardly be urged then that the decision to keep that testimony from the jury was improper. On the contrary, for trial counsel to have put Agent Neill on the stand knowing that he would have so testified on cross-examination would have elicited an equally as intensive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to depose several of the State's witnesses prior to trial. Anthony Rondolino testified at the 3.850 evidentiary hearing that not only was the Public Defender's file not complete as to all

depositions actually taken, but that some of the depositions taken were not transcribed. The Petitioner can only theorize as to the truth of his contention, and the Court cannot make a finding of ineffectiveness based on mere supposition.

The Petitioner further contends that trial counsel did not depose three State witnesses until after the trial had commenced. However, the Petitioner's expert witness, attorney Patrick Doherty, who testified at the 3.850 evidentiary hearing, did not consider it to be a fatal defect in a first degree murder defense not to take a deposition of an expert witness until after commencement of the trial. The Court finds no incompetency in this aspect of the defense.

The Petitioner claims his trial counsel had access to at least six character witnesses, only one of whom actually testified on the Petitioner's behalf during the penalty phase of the trial. With respect to trial counsel's failure to call additional character witnesses, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that anything more would have been gained by putting those witnesses on the stand during the sentencing phase of the trial. "Complaints concerning uncalled witnesses impose a heavy showing since the presentation of testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy and often allegations of what a witness would have testified to are largely speculative." United States v. Guerra, 628 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1980). At the 3.850 evidentiary hearing, the

Petitioner called only two of the aforementioned witnesses to testify as to their willingness and ability to testify at the trial; however, it appears that neither uncalled witness would have contributed any additional or beneficial testimony on the Petitioner's behalf. In fact, one witness testified that he would have testified to the Petitioner's reputation in the community for break-ins. As to the remaining four witnesses, no one knows what they would have testified to. Trial counsel's failure to put on these additional witnesses is not an indication of ineffectiveness.

The Petitioner buttresses his claims of ineffectiveness by contending that Thomas Cole's involvement in another felony case rendered him physically and

emotionally exhausted, and therefore, trial counsel was unable to adequately defend the Petitioner. In suport, the Petitioner places much weight on the fact that shortly before trial, Cole declared that he was unable to give the Petitioner a fair trial. Obviously this Court cannot make a finding of ineffectiveness based on counsel's pretrial statement, without some substantial objective evidence to support it. That urged by Petitioner is insufficient. The Florida Supreme Court, in finding no error in the trial court's granting of the consolidation motion, also found that trial counsel was, in fact, prepared to try all offenses on the scheculed trial date. King v. State, 390 So.2d 115, 117-118 (Fla. 1980.

In the present case, the record of the state trial court proceedings indicates that attorneys Cole and Rondolino rendered effective assistance by 1) appropriate pretrial preparation, 2) actively participating in voir dire examination, 3) cross-examining the State's witnesses in a manner favorable to their apparent trial strategy, and 4) making meaningful and timely objections. In his closing argument to the jury, trial counsel Cole effectively addressed the circumstantial nature of the State's case against the Petitioner. Therefore, based upon the totality of the circumstances and the entire record, the Court finds that trial counsel's assistance was more than reasonably effective, and that accordingly the Petition for Habeas Corpus relief must be denied.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida this 1st day of February, 1982.

/s/ William Castagna
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Baya Harrison, III, Esq.
P. O. Box 1719
Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Michael Kotler, Esq.
Assistant Attorey General
The Park Trammell Building, Suite 804
1313 Tampa Street
Tampa, Florida 33602

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MAR 1 9 1984
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, Warden,
Florida State Penitentiary,
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary,
Department of Corrections, and
JIM SMITH, Attorney General,
State of Florida,

Petitioners,

vs.

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Respondent.
_____/

CASE NO. _____

83-1287

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON JURISDICTION

Comes now Amos Lee King, Jr., respondent, by his undersigned attorney, and submits this response to the brief of petitioners on jurisdiction, stating:

I. QUESTION PRESENTED BY PETITIONER

"Whether The Continued Rejection Of The Florida Supreme Court's Standard Of Sixth Amendment Assistance Of Counsel By The Court Of Appeals Requires This Court's Intervention And Ultimate Resolution Of The Conflict As In The Pending Case Of Strickland v. Washington, Case No. 82-1554."

II. OPINIONS BELOW

Petitioners' account of the applicable opinions below is accurately represented on page one of their brief on jurisdiction.

III. JURISDICTION

Petitioners are attempting to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Petitioners' statement as to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions found on pages three and four of their brief on jurisdiction is correct.

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners' account of the history of the case and some of the facts as presented at pages four through 11 of their brief on jurisdiction are accurate. However, beginning on page 12 of the brief, petitioners' version of the "...facts material to consideration of the question presented..." is incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, respondent sets forth below the truly shocking facts of the case which make it obvious that the respondent was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase during his state court trial applying even the lowest standard of competency of a trial lawyer.

Assistant Public Defender Thomas A. Cole, deceased, represented respondent at the penalty phase.(P 122)[1] It was his first capital case. (P 122) Petitioners infer that Mr. Cole was aided by Assistant Public Defender Anthony Rondolino "... in the preparation of this case for trial...in a limited manner." (Petitioners' brief at 15) However this assistance did not include the penalty phase of the trial. (P122, 123, 174; R 2015-2035)

Mr. Cole neglected to even discuss the penalty phase with the respondent. Thus Mr. Cole told the state trial judge, "... I haven't spoken to the death penalty to the client..." (P184; R 1822)

Nor did Mr. Cole bother to talk to any of the six mitigation witnesses that the respondent had tried to have Mr. Cole contact prior to trial (a list of these witnesses was found by Mr. Rondolino in Mr. Cole's working file; P 136, 137). In this regard Mr. Cole told the trial judge immediately before the penalty phase of the trial began:

---

1. The letter "P" refers to the transcript of the state habeas corpus hearing. "R" refers to the record on appeal in state court. All underlined emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

I (Mr. Cole) want a day, give me a day's delay so I can speak to the witnesses. (R 1822; P 184-186)

He also stated:

I need time to talk to the witnesses. (R 1834)

When asked why Mr. Cole failed to muster anything more than a semblance of a defense for the respondent in general, attorney Patrick Doherty[2] testified during the state court habeas corpus hearing:

Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Did you actually see him during this time?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Would you describe his--the way he looked?

A. He (Mr. Cole) was physically exhausted. Well, first of all, he was physically exhausted, and that was obvious before he mentioned, even mentioned it. He did tell me that as well. I might point out, four days before the trial, I believe, he lost his glasses. (P 187)

The reason Mr. Cole was exhausted was not because he had been preparing the Amos King case for trial. On the contrary, the several months prior to trial were dominated by another legal matter. In this regard Mr. Doherty testified:

Q. Would you please explain to His Honor the degree to which Mr. Cole was involved in the Scott case while the Amos Lee King case was pending?

A. Well, I think His Honor probably remembers full well. I think this judge tried that case, but at any rate, Scott was first tried on May 17 of 1977, and he was charged with some kind of burglary wherein the victim of the burglary was stabbed with a fondue fork through her nose into her brain, causing her to be permanently amnesiac, causing her to be obviously permanently injured. The thrust of Mr. Cole's involvement in that case arose out of this set of circumstances.

Mr. Scott was, according to my recollection, given three different polygraph tests which he passed and indicated that he was innocent on three different occasions. Mr. Cole fervently believed in

2. Mr. Doherty, an experienced criminal trial lawyer, testified on behalf of the respondent regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

> this person's innocence, this man protested his innocence at every turn in the road. This was probably the biggest case Tom Cole ever had as a criminal lawyer. He worried about it day and night and it was in that set of circumstances that the Amos Lee King case was being prepared, if it was being prepared.
>
> In other words, what I am saying to you, at every turn in the road, Amos King's case was being overshadowed by the Scott case. It was a consuming interest of Mr. Cole. It was tried all the way to mistrial on one occasion. It was reset for trial, I believe, on June 22, 1977. It was tried up until June 24, 1977. Mr. Cole reached the apogee of his career, in most people's estimation, that day. Mr. Scott was found not guilty 11 days later. This case was kicked over for trial, I believe.
>
> Q. Do you feel that that involvement in the Scott case was prejudicial to Mr. King in terms of Mr. Cole's attention to the King case?
>
> A. Yes, not only do I feel that, but I feel that the record speaks eloquently to that point on about five different occasions. Mr. Cole indicated that he was exhausted and that he didn't know what was going on and that he was tired, he needed to go home, go to sleep. If you want, I can cite the record to that effect, and I would be more than happy to do that. (P 183, 184)

Mr. Rondolino acknowledged Mr. Cole's commitment to the Scott case when he testified that he (Cole) was:

> ...devoted to that case to the extent of being involved emotionally, psychologically, mentally, pressing forward all of his efforts to the Scott case. (P 126)

And Mr. Cole himself made it clear that, as a result of his involvement in the Scott case, he had neither the time nor the energy to adequately assist the respondent. Thus, as summarized by Mr. Doherty, Mr. Cole[2] is quoted as telling the state trial court:

> A. ...starting on page 2149, he says as an officer of the court, I cannot give Amos Lee King a fair trial today or this week. Now, that was at a pre-trial motion to continue. No one made any even passing

2. For clarity, Mr. Doherty, testifying during the state court habeas corpus hearing, is quoting Mr. Cole from the original trial record.

reference to that. The importance of that is that he stated it as an officer of the court, and the importance is that he is telling the Court this is no joke, I am not fooling around, period.

Now, on page 2075 of the record, he says I cannot effectively communicate with him, meaning Mr. King here, I cannot effectively communicate with him to prepare adequately to represent him, would renew my motion to withdraw.

On page 1621, he says I don't know what is going on now.

On page 1643, he moves for a mistrial, and then evidently forgets why he moved for a mistrial and says he--I don't know the circumstances of moving for mistrial.

On page 1713 of the record, he says, I can't think anymore.

On page 1812 of the record, he says, Judge, I am beat, I need some sleep.

On page 1839 of the record, the record pretty well discloses during the course of the jury charge conference, Tom was writing his closing argument.

On page 1822 of the record, he says that I haven't spoken to the death penalty to the client, I want a day, give me a day's delay so I can speak to the witnesses. The Court says we are not going to delay, we are going ahead now.

He says again on 1834, I need time to talk to the witnesses.

On page 1713 of the record, he says I have got a long cross-examination, I can't think any more. At one point, he asked for a proffer--

THE COURT: Wait a minute. At that point, did he not receive a recess, Mr. Doherty?

MR. DOHERTY: No, I think at that point, Judge, Doug Prior turned to you and said Mr. Cole always does this in all his trials and this is--essentially, he is saying Mr. Cole is lying. I didn't see any notation of a recess at that point.

THE COURT: What witness was it that he was preparing to cross-examine?

MR. DOHERTY: I believe I would have to look at the record to tell you about that.

THE COURT: How about checking to see if it was not Dr. Wood, and further, he received a recess when requested, the last

witness.

MR. DOHERTY: I understand that the record--is the record in evidence?

THE COURT: I don't know what is here, frankly. Everything that is here is in evidence.

MR. DOHERTY: Now, on page 1774, he says--this is probably the most interesting one he made, on page 1774 of the record, he says I can't think, Judge, of what I am doing. At that point, Mr. Rondolino turns to the judge and says, apparently Mr. Cole is tired. Now the fact of the matter is that in this setting, we are all talking about Mr. Cole and the fact that he is exhausted and everybody, of course, in this whole setting knows why he is exhausted, because he just finished the Scott trial 11 days earlier. (P 184-186)

Thus, the record as carefully referenced above establishes beyond doubt that Mr. Cole lacked more than just the experience necessary to effectively represent the respondent at the penalty phase. In addition, Mr. Cole was physically and emotionally exhausted as a result of the two Scott trials which immediately preceeded the respondent's. His overriding concern for Mr. Scott (to the exclusion of the respondent) and his extraordinary labors during Mr. Scott's trials left him with neither the time to prepare for nor the energy to effectively participate in the sentencing phase of the respondent's trial.

For reasons of their own, the petitioners would have the court ignore this most relevant aspect of the case. Instead they try to downplay the situation by claiming merely that, "...Mr. Cole informed the Court that he would appreciate a night to relax." (The petitioners' brief at 12) Mr. Cole's diminished condition and resulting failure to prepare for the penalty phase was not lost on the court of appeals,

however, as noted specifically in its opinion (See petitioners' brief citing the court of appeals' opinion at A 22-24).

Mr. Cole called one character witness during the penalty phase, a minister and former employer of respondent in the gardening business, who testified that respondent was a good worker and non-violent. (R 2028-2030) Mr. Cole also mentioned to the jury that several other individuals (another former employer and a corrections officer) who knew the respondent felt he was a good worker and well behaved. (The court of appeals' opinion in petitioners' brief at A 44, 45) However, as the court of appeals noted "...it is clear that (Mr. Cole) neglected to present other available evidence" at the penalty phase. (The court of appeals opinion cited in petitioners' appendix at A 46).

The court below was referring to Mr. William Brown, Jr. who testified at the state court habeas corpus hearing that he knew and thought extremely well of the respondent in 1977. (P 234, 235) He also stated:

> Q. (By Mr. Harrison) Okay. Sir, if you had been asked to appear in court to testify in his behalf as to his character in July, 1977, would you have been able and willing to do so?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. Were you called to testify in that regard for him?
>
> A. No, I weren't, but I was subpoenaed to court, but I didn't have no--do no testifying. The lawyer told me he didn't need me.
>
> Q. Who was that?
>
> A. I don't know his name. I don't know the lawyer's name.

Q. You were subpoenaed by Mr. Cole?

A. Yes, I guess that was him.

Q. All right, sir. But did you come to court like you had been subpoenaed to do?

A. Yes, I was here in court.

Q. And would you have testified if Mr. Cole had put you on the stand?

A. I would have. (P 236)

Mr. Willie Scott, another acquaintance of the respondent's, testified at the habeas hearing in the same vein. (P 238-241)

Mr. Brown noted that there were many other people who would have testified in the respondent's behalf had they merely been asked. (P 237) This fact is confirmed by Mr. Rondolino who testified (as mentioned above) that he found in Mr. Cole's working file a list of six character witnesses only one of whom actually testified for the respondent during the penalty phase of the trial. (P 136, 137)

Mr. Rondolino acknowledged that the respondent was not afforded adequate legal representation at the penalty phase when he said:

Q. (By Mr. Harrison) What about the preparation that went into the sentencing phase of this trial? Do you think that was adequate?

A. Well, in retrospect, it does not appear to be.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Simply because of the number of witnesses that could have been called that weren't, and because of my involvement in cases since that time, it would have been handled in a different manner. (P 144)

Mr. Doherty testified that Mr. Cole's representation of the respondent at the penalty phase was a substantially serious deficiency which fell measurably below that of competent counsel. (P 214) In this regard it is

worth mentioning that Mr. Cole concluded his representation of the respondent by virtually acknowledging to the jury and judge that the state had proven "beyond a doubt" an aggravating circumstance (that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel) sufficient to send the respondent to the electric chair under Sec. 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). Mr. Cole also indicated to the jury and judge his less than voluntary association with the respondent and his personal revulsion as to the alleged capital offense. Thus Mr. Cole argued:

> It is extremely difficult for me to talk to you at this time. This is the first time that I have ever been in a position like this. I have been practicing law for three years now, Assistant Public Defender, and I have never defended a murder case before. I think that you all understand that the job I had to do this week and you can appreciate what I had to do.
>
> You can convict Amos of a cruel and evil crime. There is no doubt about it. Murder upsets me very much and I am also human, I have feelings, I have been to Raiford which is the State Prison. (ROT 2031, 2032)

Even when one reads these comments in the context of Mr. Cole's entire (skimpy) closing argument at sentencing, it is clear that he unabashedly conceded that the state had proven "beyond a doubt" one of the aggravating factors ("the commission of a cruel and evil crime"; ROT 2031 and Sec. 921.141 (5)(b), Fla. Stat.) that the state had to establish in order for the jury to recommend (and for the trial judge to be able to sentence the respondent to) death! Further, it is obvious that Mr. Cole was effectively stating that he had been representing the respondent on a reluctantly appointed basis regarding an offense which he (Cole) believed was repre-

VI. THE REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT PETITION

Petitioners argue that the court should grant certiorari review in the instant case for the same reason that it granted certiorari in Strickland v. Washington, this court's Case No. 82-1554. That is, the petitioners argue that since the court of appeals in the case at bar applied the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals standard of ineffectiveness of counsel (as announced in Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982)) as opposed to the Florida Supreme Court standard (as announced in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981)), the court of appeals' opinion in the case at bar should be reviewed in order to resolve the "conflict" between the two standards. (Petitioners' brief at 18-23)

Petitioners are in error because they admit later in their brief on jurisdiction (at page 24) that the court of appeals actually applied the more stringent elements of the "Knight" standard in the case at bar.

In Washington v. Strickland, supra, the en banc court of appeals specifically rejected the "outcome-determinative" test for prejudice regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims (693 F.2d at 1278). Instead, the court of appeals held that, while it is not necessary for the defendant to prove that his counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome[3] of the proceedings, it is necessary for the defendant to show that counsel's ineffectiveness "... resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense " (693 F.2d at 1262).

3. "We believe that where the petitioner has shouldered the considerable burden of showing a violation of his sixth amendment rights that resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to his case, it is inequitable to encumber him with the further responsibility of showing that the disadvantage determined the outcome of the entire case" (693 F.2d, 1262).

Florida's "Knight" standard, on the other hand, embraces the "outcome-determinative" test by requiring the defendant to "... demonstrate a prejudice to the defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the proceedings." Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).

On page 24 of petitioners' brief on jurisdiction, they admit that the court of appeals employed Florida's "outcome-determinative" test in the case at bar. Thus, petitioners state flatly:

> Based on the material facts presented herein, the Eleventh Circuit squarely held that King's lawyer rendered ineffective representation at the sentencing phase of the trial and that the representation created both factual and substantial disadvantage to the course of the defense and a great likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial.

This is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Doherty that Mr. Cole's ineffectiveness during the penalty phase and otherwise negatively affected the outcome of the trial. (P 209-211) This is also consistent with the fact that the court of appeals did not cite Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th. Cir. Unit B 1982) regarding the penalty phase of respondent's trial except for a general proposition regarding "... the importance of pre-trial preparation and investigation."

Since the court of appeals "squarely" applied the "outcome-determinative" test in the case at bar according to petitioners, how can they complain? This is after all the "Knight" standard that they argue is the correct one to employ in determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first place.

Stated slightly differently, this is not a case which falls within the parameters of Rule 17.1(a),

Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, providing that the court may "... for special and important reasons..." grant certiorari "... when a federal court of appeals ... has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last resort..." According to petitioners, the court of appeals did not apply federal law which conflicts with state law. The court of appeals merely reached a factual conclusion with which petitioners disagree. This disagreement however is not a basis for granting petitioners the relief they seek. In this context, as has been said on numerous occasions by members of this court, the Supreme Court is not primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. As former Chief Justice Taft wrote:

> The jurisdiction (of the Supreme Court to review cases by way of certiorari) was not conferred upon this court merely to give the defeated party in the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our experience shows that 80% of those who petition for certiorari do not appreciate these necessary limitations upon our issue of the writ. Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, at 163 (1923).

In truth, the court of appeals in the case at bar based its decision to a great extent upon the factually similar case of Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th. Cir. 1982), cert. denied ___U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 1798,76 L.Ed. 2d 364 (1983). In Goodwin the court appointed attorney failed to prepare adequately for trial. This included not interviewing important witnesses (similarly Mr. Cole failed to timely interview mitigation witnesses which could have been used effectively during the penalty phase) and generally failing to protect the defendant's interests during the penalty phase.

the client as follows:

> To better understand the reasons for trial counsel's ineffective preparation, investigation and handling of this case, an examination of the testimony presented to the state habeas corpus court and comments made during trial is revealing. The Walton County Superior Court appointed counsel and co-counsel to represent Goodwin. Addressing the jury during opening argument and again in the sentencing phase of trial, both counsel and co-counsel alerted the jury to the fact of their appointed status. Counsel justified the reasons for doing so in his state habeas corpus deposition:
>
> Q. I notice that either you or (co-counsel) in your argument made it clear to the jury that you were appointed.
>
> A. Yes, sure.
>
> Q. Why did you do that?
>
> A. Well, you have to live out here.
>
> Q. I'm not sure I understand, sir.
>
> A. Well, as I say--if you're not a country boy--you live in the community and you get a reputation of representing, I got that around here for a while, of representing everybody that killed somebody. Well, they don't like you. They don't realize that everybody's entitled to a defense. It's just human nature, I suppose.
>
> The state interprets the references to appointed status as nothing more than a legitimate trial tactic aimed at soliciting sympathy from the jury. This interpretation is difficult to accept in light of the reason given by trial counsel. Goodwin, on the other hand submits that this type of attitude explains why counsel failed to challenge the composition of the grand and petit juries, neglected to object to Witherspoon violations, and failed to object to the use of leading questions by the prosecution. We tend to agree with Goodwin, but our reasoning goes further. Admitted concerns over community ostracism do more than inhibit a lawyer's actions at trial where his performance is visible by fellow citizens. An attitude such as this impairs the vitality of investigation, preparation and representation that all clients deserve, indigent or otherwise. Fears of negative public reaction to the thought of representing

> Moreover, reminding a jury that the undertaking is not by choice, but in service to the public, effectively stacks the odds against the accused. Although we deplore the sentiments expressed by Goodwin's trial counsel, we cannot overemphasize that the culpability of counsel is not the issue. Rather, our concern centers on the sixth amendment right of the defendant. 684 F.2d at 805, 806

Similarly the court of appeals in the case at bar determined:

> Although Cole presented some mitigating evidence, it is clear that counsel neglected to present other available evidence. The record also suggests this failure cannot be deemed a strategic decision taken after a reasonable investigation into the alternatives. This Court has emphasized the importance of pretrial preparation and investigation. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, ____ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 76 L.Ed.2d ___ (1983); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d at 805-805, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 104-105 (5th Cir. 1979). Here, counsel admitted he was unprepared for the penalty stage of the trial, because he had not adequately discussed sentencing with his client nor had he carefully searched for mitigating evidence.
>
> These errors occurred at a particularly critical point in the trial.
>
> > The sentencing stage of any case, regardless of the potential punishment, is "the time at which for many defendants the most important services of the entire proceeding can be performed." ABA Standards on the Administration of Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §5.3(e). The special importance of the capital sentencing proceeding gives rise to a duty on the part of defense counsel to be prepared for that crucial phase of the trial. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 963.

Although this Court apparently has never

held counsel ineffective in a capital case solely because of failure to present mitigating evidence, see id. at 964, it has on a number of occasions cited this failure as one factor suggesting ineffectiveness. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 1982); Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981); Mason v. Balkcom, 531 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1976).

As in those cases, counsel here did not merely neglect to present available mitigating evidence. He made a closing argument that may have done more harm than good. In his argument, the main thrust of which was that the defendant if given life would be secured in prison for many years, King's attorney unnecessarily stressed the horror of the crime and counsel's status as an appointed representative:

> It is extremely difficult for me to talk to you at this time. This is the first time that I have ever been in a position like this. I have been practicing law for three years now, Assistant Public Defender,and I have never defended a murder case before. I think that you all understand that the job I had to do this week and you can appreciate what I had to do.
>
> You can convict Amos of a cruel and evil crime. There is no doubt about it. Murder upsets me very much and I am also human, I have feelings, I have been to Raiford which is the State Prison.
>
> Now you might not think that Amos deserves to live in our society of civilized people. You might not consider him right now as a human being and what you convicted him of was an evil and gross crime but I am not asking you to put him back out on the streets or take a chance that he will ever be back out there because in Florida the legislature passed a law which means that when you convicted a man of first degree murder if you don't if he is not sent to the electric chair, then he automatically goes to prison for life and for twenty years he is not eligible for parole. He is not eligible

> for parole. He will be in maximum security at Raiford, not a work release center.
>
> In effect, counsel separated himself from his client, conveying to the jury that he had reluctantly represented a defendant who had committed a reprehensible crime. "(R)eminding a jury that the undertaking is not by choice, but in service to the public, effectively stacks the odds against the accused." Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d at 806, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983). Rather than attempting to humanize King, counsel in his closing argument stressed the inhumanity of the crime.
>
> We hold that this argument in combination with counsel's failure to present available mitigating evidence denied King effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the trial. (See Petitioners' brief at A46-50).

VII. CONCLUSION

This court denied certiorari in Goodwin v. Balkcom, supra, and based on that case the court should deny the petition for certiorari here. It is obvious that the respondent was used as a guinea pig in order that his inexperienced, over worked, exhausted, reticent assistant public defender might cut his teeth on his first capital case. This great court should not lend dignity to the travesty of justice that followed by granting petitioners relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Baya Harrison

BAYA HARRISON
Attorney for Respondent
317½ East Park Avenue
Tallahassee, FL 32301
(904) 224-9887

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to Michael J. Kotler, Esq., Assistant

Attorney General of Florida, counsel for petitioners, Park Trammell Building, 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804, Tampa, Florida 33602 by regular U.S. Mail this 17th day of March, 1984.

Baya Harrison

BAYA HARRISON

G

RECEIVED
MAR 19 1984
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, Warden,
Florida State Penitentiary,
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary,
Department of Corrections, and
JIM SMITH, Attorney General,
State of Florida,

Petitioners,

83-1287

-vs-

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Respondent.
_____/

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Comes now Amos Lee King, Jr., respondent, by his undersigned attorney, and moves the court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis and for other relief, stating:

1. The respondent is indigent and insolvent as evidenced by the attached affidavit the terms of which are incorporated herein.

2. The respondent does not have the funds to print and distribute responses to the petitioners' jurisdictional brief.

WHEREFORE the court is requested to allow respondent to proceed in forma pauperis and, among other things, to submit limited numbers of copies of his briefs on regular 8 by 11 1/2 inch white paper as opposed to having the briefs printed.

Respectfully submitted,

Baya Harrison

Baya Harrison, Esquire
Attorney at Law
317½ East Park Avenue
Tallahassee, FL 32301
(904) 224-9887

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished to Michael J. Kottler, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for the Petitioners, Department of Legal Affairs, Office of the Attorney General, Park Trammell Building, 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804, Tampa, FL 33602 by regular U.S. Mail, this 22nd day of February, 1984.

Baya Harrison

Baya Harrison

RECEIVED
MAR 19 1984
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CHARLES G. STRICKLAND, Warden,
Florida State Penitentiary,
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary,
Department of Corrections, and
JIM SMITH, Attorney General,
State of Florida,

Petitioners,

83-1287

vs.

AMOS LEE KING, JR.,

Respondent.
_____/

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, Amos Lee King, Jr., being duly sworn, depose and say that I am the respondent, in the above-entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed herein without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor:

I further swear that the responses which I have made to the questions and instructions below relating to my inability to pay the cost of responding to the petition are true.

1. I am not employed. I was last employed at Nellie Kelly's Restaurant and the salary per month that I received was about $320.00.

2. I have not received any income from a business, profession or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest, dividends or any other source within the last twelve months.

3. I do not own any cash or checking or savings account.

4. I do not own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property.

5. I have no dependants to support.

6. I am presently incarcerated at Florida State Prison near Raiford, Florida under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, State of Florida.

7. I have been so incarcerated after being convicted of first degree murder and other offenses from Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County in Case No. 77-1696 in July of 1977.

8. I am and have been since my incarceration totally and completely indigent and insolvent.

9. My total assets are $1.00.

10. The total value of all my wordly assets and possessions is less than $10.00.

I understand that a false statement or answer to any questions in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for perjury.

Amos Lee King Jr.
AMOS LEE KING, JR.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 21st day of February, 1984.

Bernice J. Jennings
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing affidavit has been furnished to Jim Smith, Attorney General, State of Florida, The Capital Complex, Tallahassee, FL 32301 by regular U.S. Mail, this 14th day of March, 1984.

Baya Harrison